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UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY
OF NEW YORK V. NEW JERSEY
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN A
COMPLEX SOCIETY
ROBERT A. McTAMANEY*

I. INTRODUCTION
HE contract clause of our Federal Constitution' prompts thoughts of

T

Dartmouth College,2 corporate charters with helpful grandfather
provisions, 3 and the Supreme Court cases in the 1930's which invalidated

President Roosevelt's economic legislation through a literalistic application of a "freedom of contract" under the due process clauses. 4 To
business lawyers dealing specifically with municipal bond finance, the
contract clause has had an importance basic to their practice in that it
traditionally has been considered to protect promises to creditors by
governments, muncipal subdivisions, and public authorities against
abrogation by subsequent legislative bodies. This tenet of municipal
finance has been such a foundation of this area of the law that few if any

practitioners seriously questioned its application.
On April 27, 1977, the United States Supreme Court, in United States

Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey,5 considered the application of
the contract clause to municipal bond covenants for the first time in
almost thirty-five years. 6 United States Trust prompted an unparalleled

interest in the municipal finance community, and the Court's holding that
* Member, New York and New Jersey Bars. The author is associated with counsel for
plaintiff in United States Trust.
1. "No State shall. . . pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... " U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
2. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
3. See H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 340
(2d ed. 1970).
4. See 1 The Constitution and the Supreme Court 298-300 (L. Pollak ed. 1966).
5.

431 U.S. 1 (1977).

6. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). State Courts
had considered the application of the contract clause to municipal bond covenants prior to United
States Trust. E.g., First Nat' Bank v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 153 Me. 131, 136 A.2d 699 (1957).
See generally Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, S0S P.2d 447 (1973) (en banc).

At least one state court has since cited it with approval. See, e.g., Patterson v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d
714, 363 N.E.2d 1146, 395 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1977).
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a unilateral retroactive cancellation of a material bond covenant
contravened the contract clause was hailed by municipal investors and
obligors alike. 7 This article will detail the fascinating history of United
States Trust (from the point of view of counsel for plaintiff) and its trip
through the courts and consider the modern relevance and application of
the contract clause to a society two centuries more complex than the one
in which it was conceived.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
In 1917 the States of New York and New Jersey established study
commissions to cooperate in making a thorough investigation of the
conditions of the Port of New York, to submit a comprehensive report
recommending the proper policy to be pursued for the development of the
Port, and to determine what legislation was necessary "to the end that
said port shall be efficiently and constructively organized and furnished
with modern methods of piers, rail and water and freight facilities, and
adequately protected in the event of war." 8 The two state commissions
then organized themselves into the New York, New Jersey Port and
Harbor Development Commission (the "Commission') and on December
16, 1920, issued a joint report (the "1920 Report') 9 summarizing its work,
discussing Port conditions, and setting forth a proposed compact and
comprehensive plan.
The 1920 Report outlined the chaotic, diverse, inadequate, and
congested Port facilities existing in 1920 restricting the flow of goods by
railroad, steamship, and motor truck in the Port area. Freight handling
problems of carriers were discussed extensively as were recommended
proposed solutions to the problems involved in the movement of freight
and commodities brought into, out of, and through the Port District.
Nevertheless, the 1920 Report did not deal with plans for passenger
transportation facilities.
The 1920 Report advocated the adoption of a compact between the
two states, establishing a Port District and creating a Port Authority. It
included an extensive discussion of the legal precedents concerning
congressional and state powers over interstate commerce and concluded:
"It is hoped, of course, by securing congressional approval of any plan
which may be adopted, to avoid future conflict with the Federal authority
7. E.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1977, at 12, col. 1; American Banker, Apr. 28, 1977, at 1, col.
3; Daily News, Apr. 28, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
8. Ch. 130, 1917 N.J. Laws; accord, ch. 426, 1917 N.Y. Laws (substantially the same).
9. N.Y., N.J. Port & Harbor Dev. Comm'n, Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and
Recommendations (Dec. 16, 1920).
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over interstate unification and control of the Port. But for the present the
States may act alone." 1 0
In response to the recommendations of the 1920 Commission, commissioners of both states were appointed with authorization to enter
into an agreement or compact in the form specified in the statute and
to seek the consent of Congress in respect of the agreement. 1 On April
30, 1921, the Compact between the two states (the "Compact") relating
to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the "Port
Authority") 12 was actually signed. 13 Congressional consent to "each
and every part and article" of the Compact was obtained effective
August 23, 1921.14
Certain provisions of the Compact were to be of importance in
United States Trust, particularly those which emphasized the character of the new agency as an independently financed entity without call
on the tax power or credit of either state. The preamble of the
Compact stated that "[t]he future development of such terminal,
transportation and other facilities of commerce will require the expenditure of large sums of money, and the cordial cooperation of the states
of New York and New Jersey in the encouragement of the investment
of capital, and in the formulation and execution of the necessary
physical plans . . . . "IsArticle II of the Compact created the Port of
New York District comprising an area of about 1500 square miles in
both states centering about the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor. 16 Article mEI established the Port Authority as "a body corporate
and politic, having the powers and jurisdiction hereinafter enumerated, and such other and additional powers as shall be conferred upon
it by the legislature of either state concurred in by the legislature of the
other, or by act or acts of congress ....,,i7 Article VI of the Compact
vested in the Port Authority "full power and authority to purchase,
construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility
within" the Port District and authorized the Port Authority
"to borrow money and secure the same by bonds or by mortgages
10. Id. at 446.

11.

Ch. 151, 1921 N.J. Laws; ch. 154, 1921 N.Y. Laws.
12. Originally named "The Port of New York Authority," the agency's name was changed to
"The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey" effective July 1, 1972. Ch. 69, 1972 N.J.
Laws; ch. 531, 1972 N.Y. Laws.
13. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1-1 to 24 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 6401-6423
(McKinney 1961).
14. Pub. Res. No. 17, 42 Stat. 174, 180 (1921).
15. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-1 (West 1963); accord, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6401 (McKinney
1961) (substantially the same).
16. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-3 (Vest 1963); N.Y. Unconsol, Laws § 6403 (McKinney 1961).
17. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-4 (Vest 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6404 (McKinney 1961).
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....
,"18 Article VII provided that the Port Authority "shall have such
additional powers and duties as may hereafter be delegated to or
imposed upon it from time to time by the action of the legislature of
either state concurred in by the legislature of the other" and further
provided: "The port authority shall not pledge the credit of either state
except by and with the authority of the legislature thereof."' 9 Article
XV of the Compact provided that "[u]nless and until... revenues...
are adequate to meet all expenditures, the legislatures . . . shall
appropriate . . . such sum or sums as shall be recommended by the
port authority . . . but each state obligates itself hereunder only
to the
'20
extent of one hundred thousand dollars in any one year."
In 1922 a Comprehensive Plan for the development of the Port of
New York was adopted by the New Jersey and New York legislatures 2 I and received the consent of Congress.2 2 The Comprehensive
Plan set forth the development program initially envisioned for implementation by the Port Authority. Unification of terminals, consolidation of shipments, adaptation and coordination of existing facilities,
improvement of commercial facilities, and other freight handling improvements were set forth as principles to govern the development of
the Port District. The Comprehensive Plan proposed to establish direct
freight connections between New Jersey and Manhattan to furnish
"the most expeditious, economical and practicable transportation of
freight, especially meat, produce, milk and other commodities comprising the daily needs of the people. '23 Section 8 of the Comprehensive
Plan denied the Authority the power to levy taxes or assessments. It
provided, however, that the bonds or other securities issued by the
Port Authority would "at all times be free from taxation by either
state, ' ' 24 an important inducement for potential investors.
Pursuant to the Compact, Comprehensive Plan, and subsequent
amendments and supplements thereto, the Port Authority operates all
of the interstate vehicular tunnels and bridges in the Port District, the
metropolitan area's three international airports, and many freight,
marine and bus terminals. The Port Authority also owns and operates
18. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-7 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6407
19. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-8 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6408
20. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-16 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6416
The states paid the expenses of the Port Authority through 1934; not until

(McKlnney 1961).
(McKinney 1961).
(McKinney 1961).
1935 did the Port

Authority become self-supporting.
21.
Ch. 9, 1922 N.J. Laws; ch. 43, 1922 N.Y. Laws.

22.
23.
24.

Pub. Res. No. 66, 42 Stat. 822 (1922).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-29 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6455 (McKinney 1961).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-33 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6459 (McKinney 1961).
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Trans-Hudson system ("PATH") and the World
the Port Authority
25
Trade Center.

B. Port Authority Participationin Rail Transit Prior to 1962
The modern vision of the Port Authority as an agency intended since
its inception to assume passenger transit duties 26 does not survive
historical analysis. Throughout the first forty years of the agency's existence, the states made various efforts to solve the passenger transit
problem without reference to the Port Authority. As early as 1921 New
York created a commission to prepare "a preliminary plan and report,
including estimates, for the combination, improvement and extension
of existing rapid transit railroads, street surface railroads, and . . .
omnibus lines and any railroad used for local service, operating
between a point or points within the city of'27New York and a point or
points within the county of Westchester.
In 1922 New Jersey established a commission to study and report
upon plans for providing a comprehensive scheme of rapid transit
between various communities in northern New Jersey and the City of
New York. The legislation which established the commission acknowledged that the Port Authority's Comprehensive Plan "in its consideration of transportation problems does not include the problem of
passenger traffic in the territory covered by said port development plan
"28

In 1926, the New Jersey Legislature continued the existence of the
North Jersey Transit Commission and authorized this body to
negotiate and study in cooperation with New York authorities the

legal, financial and interstate aspects of a rapid transit plan.2 9 On

February 20, 1928, the North Jersey Transit Commission issued its
1927 report to the New Jersey Legislature. The Commission stated:
"[G]rave questions arise whether [the Port Authority], already charged
with the important work of coordinating freight operations of the Port
25.

1976] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep. The Holland Tunnel was constructed by

separate state commissions pursuant to a compact between the states which received the consent
of Congress. Chs. 49, 50, 1918 N.J. Laws; ch. 178, 1919 N.Y. Laws. In 1930 the Holland Tunnel
was transferred to the Port Authority to enable it to honor its obligations to bondholders in the
face of deficits incurred in connection with the Arthur Kill, George Washington, and Bayonne
Bridges and Inland Terminal No. 1. Ch. 247, 1930 N.J. Laws; ch. 421,

1930 N.Y. Laws.

26. See United States Trust Co. v. State, 69 N.J. 253, 265-66; 353 A.2d 514, 520-21 (1976)
(Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
27. Ch. 591, 1921 N.Y. Laws.
28. Ch. 104, 1922 N.J. Laws.
29. Ch. 157, 1926 N.J. Laws.
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District and in addition with the detailed labor of financing and
constructing no less than four interstate bridges, can bring to the study
'30
of the passenger transit situation the requisite time and attention.
With respect to the financing of the proposed rapid transit system, the
Commission recommended public financing backed by the full faith
and credit of the transit
district coupled with a benefits assessment for
31
local improvements.
In 1927 the New Jersey Legislature, purportedly acting "[u]nder
and pursuant to the provisions of the [Port Authority] compact,"
authorized and directed the Port Authority "to make such plans.., as
will provide adequate interstate and suburban transportation facilities
for passengers traveling to and from one State to the other within the
said district, and from one part of the said district to another,
sometimes referred to as commuter or suburban passenger traffic.
. .-"32 The Port Authority was also directed to "submit, as part of its
report, a legal plan for the financing of the said improvements through
the Port of New York Authority as the corporate municipal instrumentality of the two States or otherwise . . . ,,33 This legislation was
signed by Governor Moore of New Jersey and was approved in 1928
by the New York Legislature but was vetoed by Governor Alfred E.
Smith, who said in support of his veto: "I am entirely unwilling to
give my approval to any measure which at the expense of the solution
of the great freight distribution problem will set the Port Authority off
on an entirely new line of problem
connected with the solution of the
'34
suburban passenger problem.
As was later found by the trial court, despite repeated studies, 35 the
Smith veto "to all intents and purposes ended any legislative effort to
involve the Port Authority in an active role in commuter transit for the
'36
next 30 years."
In the 1958 session of the New Jersey State Legislature, Assembly
Bill No. 16 was introduced which provided that the Port Authority
would take over and financially develop, improve, and operate interstate passenger rail transportation between New Jersey and New
30.

North Jersey Transit Comm'n Ann. Rep. 5 (1927).

31.

Id.

32.
33.

Ch. 277, 1927 N.J. Laws.
Id.

34.
35.

N.Y. State, Public Papers of Alfred E. Smith 188 (1938).
The studies are summarized in Stipulation at 1-15, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134

N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiarn, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stipulation].
36. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 149, 338 A,2d 833, 846 (L. Dlv.
1975), aff'd, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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York. In response to this bill, the Port Authority submitted a statement by its Commissioners on November 24, 1958, which argued that
prospective investors
would conclude that the subsidized Port Authority operation was only a first step in a
process of involvement, and that an attempt to divert the reserves and revenues of the
Authority would be certain to follow. No investment counsellor who has heretofore
advised his clients to purchase Port Authority bonds on the basis of
its record of
37
self-support could so counsel them again in the face of this threat.

This summary was made with reference to the statement by the
Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority dated November
24, 1958, which said in part:
Obviously, [the] market analysts would regard any Port Authority involvement in
rapid transit as a financial disaster. If the Port Authority can be compelled to assume a
deficit operation of any sort, even one not approaching the rail transit deficit in size,
investors would have a right to assume that the Authority was becoming the dumping
ground for deficit operations of all types. The Authority's credit could not survive such
a breach of its investors' present confidence that the Port Authority will restrict its
operations to facilities which it believes can eventually be made self-supporting. The
importance of this lies in the fact that it transcends arguments as to the size of the
present transit deficit. To investors it would make no difference whether the proposal
was to force a $2,000,000 or a $12,000,000 or a $20,000,000 annual deficit on the Port
Authority. Confidence is the essence of credit and it would be gone. 38

In 1959, with congressional consent, 39 the states of New Jersey and
New York entered into a compact which created the New York-New
Jersey Transportation Agency to "serve as a public agency of the states
of New York and New Jersey dealing with matters affecting public
mass transit within and between the two states. '40 This seemed to
acknowledge once again that no extant agency such as the Port
Authority had that responsibility.
In the same year the legislatures of the two states provided that
"[u]pon the election by either State . . . the Port Authority shall be

authorized and empowered" to purchase and own railroad cars for the
purpose of leasing them to commuter railroads within the electing
state. 4 1 The statutes expressly prohibited the Authority from borrowing money for the purchase of such cars until the electing state
37. Letter from Port of New York Authority to Hon. Martin Kesselhaut & Hon. J. Edward
Crabiel (Nov. 24, 1958).
38. Port of N.Y. Auth., Statement by Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority
with Respect to Assembly No. 16 Before the Committee on Federal and Interstate Relations and
Committee on Highways, Transportation and Public Utilities of the House of Assembly of the
State of New Jersey 4, 9-10 (Nov. 24, 1958).
39. Ch. 13, 1959 N.J. Laws; ch. 420, 1959 N.Y. Laws.
40. Ch. 420, 1959 N.Y. Laws; accord, ch. 13, 1959 N.J. Laws (substantially the same).
41. Ch. 25, 1959 N.J. Laws; ch. 638, 1959 N.Y. Laws.
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guaranteed payment of both principal and interest on the obligations
issued for that purpose. 4 2
New York immediately chose to have the Port Authority proceed on
its behalf to purchase railroad cars for lease to its commuter railroads. 43 The Port Authority has presently outstanding over $90 million
in New York State-guaranteed railroad car bonds and has purchased
for lease to commuter railroads within the state 467 air-conditioned
passenger cars and 8 locomotives. 44 The State of New Jersey has not
taken legislative action to participate in this commuter car program,
which involved the Port Authority in the mass transit problems of the
Port District without any adverse effect on its credit.

C. The Port Authority's Financial Structure Prior to 1962
Port Authority participation in deficit rail mass transit must be
viewed against the background of its financial structure as it developed
following the 1921 Compact. Under the Compact and Comprehensive
Plan the Port Authority was denied the power to levy taxes or to
pledge the credit of either state. 4 5 Thus by definition the Port Authority's financing was self-contained; it was to issue bonds to public
investors and pay debt service through revenues from its facilities. As
a result the agency historically limited itself to facilities which would,
perhaps not immediately, but eventually, be self-supporting and in
time contribute net revenues to the Port Authority's overall debt
service requirements. Further, it would protect its revenue stream by
entering into contractual undertakings with its third-party creditors to
establish financial safeguards intended to assure that revenues would
continue in amounts sufficient to handle debt service and provide a
comfortable cushion.
The Port Authority's modern financial structure has as its foundation the General Reserve Fund statutes of 1930, which provided for
the pooling of all surplus revenues from the agency's facilities into a
general reserve fund in an amount equal to 10% of par of all outstanding bonds. 4 6 The General Reserve Fund is pledged as security for the
payment of principal and interest on the bonds, and as a result of the
pooling provision revenues from one facility could be applied to pay
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Ch. 639, 1959 N.Y. Laws.
[1973] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep. 1l,

45.

See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.

46.

Ch. 5,

1931 N.J. Laws; ch. 48, 1931 N.Y. Laws.

72.
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debt service arising from bonds issued to construct or improve another

facility. 47

The next step in the development of the Port Authority's modem
financial structure came in 1948, when the Commissioners by resolution promised to retain in reserve amounts equal to at least the next
two years' debt service on outstanding Port Authority bonds. 48 In 1952
the Commissioners ended the prior financing practice of setting aside
specific facility revenues as security for outstanding bonds. Instead
they adopted the Consolidated Bond Resolution which authorized the
issuance of consolidated bonds as general Port Authority obligations
equally and ratably secured by a pledge of the net revenues of all of the
agency's facilities and any additional facilities4 9financed in whole or in
part by the issuance of consolidated bonds.
The Consolidated Bond Resolution of 1952 contains a number of
protections for bondholders which were to be of significance in United
States Trust. The "1.3 test" contained in section 3 of the Resolution
forbids the issuance of new consolidated bonds unless the best 12
months' net revenues (of the preceding 36 months) of all of the Port
Authority's facilities equal or are greater than 1.3 times the prospective
debt service for the calendar year in the future during which the debt
service on all outstanding and the proposed new bonds secured by the
General Reserve Fund would be at a maximum. 5 0
Beginning with the twelfth series of consolidated bonds the Port
Authority included in the Resolutions establishing each series of such
bonds a provision which prohibits the use of any consolidated bond
reserve funds to pay the operating deficits of a facility acquired unless it
is acquired through the issuance of an obligation secured by the
General Reserve Fund and the proceeds are used for that additional
facility. The second part of section 7 requires a certification by the
Commissioners prior to the issuance of consolidated bonds for a new
purpose. The Commissioners must certify that the issuance of the
bonds would not "materially impair the sound credit standing of the
Authority or the investment status of Consolidated Bonds," or the
agency's ability to fulfill its commitments to bondholders. 5 1
47. D. Goldberg, A History of the Port of New York Authority Financial Structure 3-7 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Goldberg History].
48. Port of N.Y. Auth., Gen. Res. 149 (Nov. 13, 1948).
49. Port of N.Y. Auth., Consolidated Bond Resolution (Oct. 9, 1952), reprinted in Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., Official Statement, $100,000,000 Consolidated Bonds, Forty-first Series Due
2008 (First Installment) app. v (Oct. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as CBR].
50. CBR, supra note 49, § 3.
51. E.g., Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Resolution Establishing Forty-first Series of Consolidated Bonds Due 2008, § 7 (Sept. 13, 1973), reprinted in Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Official
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These financial tests, and their adequacy as protection for bondholders, were to be the subject of dispute during the conduct of United
States Trust. Whatever their adequacy, the Port Authority's Commissioners and investors found that the provisions of the Consolidated
Bond Resolution, designed as protections, and the statutes passed as
contracts with bondholders were not adequate protections when it was
seriously proposed that the Port Authority involve itself financially in
the deficit rail mass transit problems of the Port District. This came
with the proposed acquisition of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad
by the Port Authority in 1962.
D. The Takeover of the Hudson and Manhattan and the
Enactment of the 1962 Covenant
In 1908, the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad Company (the
"H&M"), a privately owned concern, began operating a railroad facility between Hoboken and Manhattan. Service between Hudson Terminal and Jersey City commenced in 1909 and the service was
extended to Newark in 1911. The railroad was in financial difficulty
for many years, and although formal bankruptcy proceedings against it
did not commence until 1954, it had been insolvent since the early
1930's.
In 1959 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York approved a reorganization plan which left the H&M with
years but without funds to
enough cash to continue operations for two
52
provide needed capital improvements.
By 1960 the financial prospects for rail mass transit operations in the
Port District were disastrous. The Pennsylvania, Erie Lackawanna,
Reading, and Central of New Jersey Railroads estimated 1960 passenger deficits of $32 million, $8.1 million, $7 million, and $6 million,
respectively, and all but the Reading expected overall losses.5 3 In 1960
the New York City Transit System had an operating deficit in excess
of $20 million, exclusive of annual debt charges of $87 million. The
aggregate deficit from commuter operations of the New York Central,
New Haven, and Long Island Railroads, and the Staten Island Rapid
Transit Railway was estimated at between $10 million and $15 milStatement, $100,000,000 Consolidated Bonds, Forty-first Series Due 2008 (First Installment) app.
vi (Oct. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Resolution Establishing Forty-first Series of Consolidated
Bonds].
52. In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 174 F. Supp. 148, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 19S9), *ff'd sub
nom. Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960).

53. Pub. Hearings Before Senate Comm'n Created Under N.J. Sen. Res. No. 7 (1960) and
Reconstituted Under N.J. Sen. Res. No. 7 (1961) to Study the Financial Structure and Operations
of the Port of N.Y. Auth. 17-22 (Jan. 26, 1961).
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lion for the year. New York City's taxpayers' subsidies of the Staten
Island Ferry operations were approximately $6 million. 54 Thus, in
1960, the total of commuter railroad and rail transit deficits in the New
York-New Jersey area approached $128 million.
In 1960, the New Jersey Senate created a committee under the
chairmanship of Senator Frank S. Farley (the "Farley Committee") to
conduct "a full and unlimited investigation" of the Port Authority. The
Committee was authorized and directed to study "the entire financial
structure and operations" of the Port Authority and to determine
"whether or not said Port of New York Authority is fulfilling its
56
55
The Farley Committee's Report
statutory duties and obligations.
which, together with the related hearings, constitutes the principal
legislative history of the 1962 Covenant, said in part:
COMMUTER RAPID TRANSIT
At the September 27 hearing, the Port Authority suggested that:
"The Port Authority might be able to sell bonds for the acquisition and modernization
of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad and continue the financing of the States' vital
port development program,
(a) if investors could be given contractual assurance, with statutory protection, that
the Port Authority's responsibilities in the field of commuter rail transit would be
confined to the present and existing interstate Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
system . .. .

During 1961, the New York State Legislature enacted legislation which empowered
the Port Authority to proceed with the acquisition, modernization and operation of the
Hudson and Manhattan Railroad and coupled in the same bill an authorization for the
Authority to undertake the development of a World Trade Center on the east side of
lower Manhattan. The bill contained no statutory covenant to protect Port Authority
credit against future transit responsibilities which would divert its railroad deficits to
revenues and reserves pledged to its bondholders. This legislation proved unacceptable
to New Jersey because of the manner in which these two projects were "packaged" in
one statute and because the absence of such a statutory covenant, in our judgment,
endangered the future utility of the Port Authority to the 2 States. Accordingly, an
impasse developed in 1961 between the States of New York and New Jersey on the
appropriate form of legislation for these two projects.

This Committee was convinced that the credit problem which had been pointed out
by the Port of New York Authority was a valid and real one and that the Port
Authority could not assume responsibility for the complete burden of the deficit-ridden
commuter railroad problem in the area of northern New Jersey and New York. If the
Port Authority were to receive such unrestricted responsibility, there is no question but
that its sound credit position would be seriously impared [sic], if not destroyed, and it
54.

United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 150 n.22, 338 A.2d 833, 847 n.22

(L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), ret'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).

55. 1960 N.J. Sen. Res. No. 7; accord, 1961 N.J. Sen. Res. No. 7 (substantially the same).
56. Report of Special Investigating Comm. Under S. Res. No. 7, N.J. Sen. (Comm. Print
1961).
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would become impossible for the Authority to continue to move forward either with
such a rail program or with other vital transportation and terminal facilities and other
facilities of commerce desired by the 2 States in continuing the Port Authority's
tradition as a public agency.
As a result of lengthy discussions and firm insistence by the New Jersey division of
Railroad Transportation that Port Authority operation of the Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad must extend beyond the main stem, which was concurred in by New York
State conferees, the following program was adopted as acceptable to the States of New
York and New Jersey:
3. Limiting by a constitutionally-protected statutory covenant with Port Authority
bondholders the extent to which the Port Authority revenues and reserves
pledged to such bondholders can in the future be applied to the deficits of
possible future Port Authority passenger railroad facilities beyond the original
Hudson & Manhattan Railroad system . . . .

On February 13, 1962, both houses of the legislature passed this bill
by unanimous votes (with one abstention in each house) and Governor
Hughes signed the bill on the same day. Soon thereafter New York
enacted the same legislation. This legislation, which authorized the
Port Authority to construct the World Trade Center and to take over
the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad as a unified project, contained as
an integral part the Covenant limiting the agency's future involvement
in deficit rail mass transit:
The 2 States covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any
affected bonds, as hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds remain
outstanding and unpaid and the holders thereof shall not have given their consent as
provided in their contract with the port authority, . . . (b) neither the States nor the
port authority nor any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of the purposes of
this act will apply any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or reserves,
which have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as security for such bonds, for
any railroad purposes whatsoever other than permitted purposes hereinafter set
58
forth.

"Affected bonds" were defined by the 1962 Covenant to include in
effect all Port Authority consolidated bonds.5 9 "Permitted purposes"
were defined to include (i) the H&M as authorized and limited on the
effective date of the Covenant, (ii) railroad freight transportation or
terminal facilities, (iii) railroad tracks and facilities on vehicular
57.

Id.

at 21, 23-26.

58. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.55 (West 1963); accord, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6606
(McKinney 1961) (substantially the same). Governor Rockefeller's statement issued in connection
with this legislation provided in part: "To preserve the Port Authority's credit strength the bill
includes a covenant by the two States that additional deficit financing of future railroad projects
will only be undertaken within the financial limits set forth in their covenant." 1962 N.Y. Legis,
Ann. 324.
59. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1-35.55 (West 1963).
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bridges owned by the Port Authority, and (iv) any other railroad
facility acquired or constructed by the Port Authority (including but
not limited to H&M extensions) regarding which the Port Authority
made the appropriate certifications. The Port Authority was to certify
either that the facility was self-supporting or, if not, that the General
Reserve Fund at the end of the preceding calendar year was at its
statutory level (1/10 of the par value of outstanding bonds) and that the
new rail facility and all other rail facilities would not produce deficits
'60
in excess of "permitted deficits."
With respect to this fourth permitted purpose a passenger railroad
facility would be "self-supporting" if the estimated average annual net
income for the next ten years (without deducting debt service) "derived
from or incidental to such facility equals or exceeds the amount
estimated by the port authority for such 10 years to be the average
annual debt service upon bonds for purposes in connection with such
proposed facility." '6' In other words, the facility's income would have
to carry its debt service.
If a passenger railroad facility (other than the H&M, as defined in
the statute, or a facility situated upon a vehicular bridge owned by the
Port Authority) was not "self-supporting," then none of the revenues or
reserves of the Port Authority could be used for that railroad beyond
the "permitted deficits" of the facility. "Permitted deficits" were
defined to mean that the total estimated deficit (after including estimated debt service) for "the ensuing 10 years" as certified in writing by
the governors of the two states, of the H&M as authorized and
existing at the time of the 1962 legislation, and of any additional
non-self-supporting passenger railroad facility could not exceed onetenth of the General Reserve Fund as of the calendar year prior to the
62
certification.
On September 1, 1962, following enactment of the 1962 Covenant
legislation, the Port Authority, through a wholly-owned subsidiary (the
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, or "PATH"), assumed
ownership and operation of the H&M.
The Commissioners' section 7 certification 63 made with respect to
the acquisition of the H&M was made on the basis of an opinion of A.
Gerdes Kuhbach, then Director of Finance of the Port Authority, which
was prepared at the request of the Commissioners. His opinion
analyzed and reviewed the financial aspects and data relating to the
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.

63.

See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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proposed acquisition, rehabilitation, and operation of the PATH system and concluded that the section 7 certification could be made since
the anticipated net loss after debt service for the years 1969 through
1991 would level off at approximately $6,575,000 per year, an amount
that6 4 would not impair the "sound credit rating" of the Port Authority.

Promptly upon the enactment of the legislation embodying the 1962
Covenant it was attacked as unconstitutional on the theory that it
required, but did not receive, additional congressional consent. This
65 but litigation regarding the Covenant did
attack was unsuccessful,
66
not end there.
The latest challenge to the constitutional validity of the Covenant,
Gaby v. Port Authority, 67 was still pending at the time the Covenant
was retroactively repealed. The plaintiff in Gaby alleged that when
New Jersey and New York restricted the Port Authority's mass transit
duties by enacting the Covenant they in effect concluded a new
compact which was void since it did not receive the consent of
Congress, and asked that the agency be directed to formulate a mass
was deferred by the New Jersey
transit plan. 68 Consideration of Gaby
69
court when repeal became likely.
E. Path Operations and Extensions
PATH losses did not level off at $6,575,000 annually as expected by
the Port Authority, the states, and the bondholders. 70 Instead PATH's
annual losses by 1973 were almost five times that amount. 7 1 A
principal contributing factor to PATH's increasing deficits was the
refusal of the Governors of New Jersey and New York to allow PATH
to increase its fares to modern levels. Because of the significant losses
incurred by the PATH system because of increased operating costs the
Commissioners, in June 1973, voted unanimously to apply to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for an increase in the PATH fare
64. Opinion of A. Gerdes Kuhbach, Director of Finance of Port Authority (June 14, 1961) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
65. See Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240
N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
66. See, e.g., Kheel v. Port Auth., 331 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
67. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353
A.2d 514, appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
68. Id.
69. See discussion of the ultimate disposition of this case at text accompanying notes 227 to
230 infra.
70. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., Report to Interstate Commerce Commission (1973).
71. Id.

1977]

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY

from 30 to 50 cents. 72 This fare increase would have been the first one
permitted to PATH in 12 years. Although neither Governor exercised
his veto over the proposed fare increase, Governor Rockefeller, in
September 1973, in return for political support for a 1973 New York
transportation bond issue, announced that the fare increase should be
limited to five cents. 7 3 At a meeting of Commissioners some five days
after the Rockefeller announcement, all of the New York Commissioners reversed themselves and unanimously voted to limit the increase to
five cents. Since, however, the New Jersey Commissioners were not, at
that time, subject to the pressures being exerted upon the New York
Commissioners, they voted unanimously against limiting the fare
increase to five cents. 74 In 1974, however, at the ICC hearing on the
proposed 20-cent increase, Commissioner Sagner, an appointee of
newly elected Governor Byrne, announced his and Governor Byrne's
opposition to the increase. The Commissioners
promptly voted to
75
rescind the PATH fare increase request.
While the PATH fare has remained at 30 cents for almost 14 years,
an equivalent ride between Newark and Manhattan on the federally
subsidized AMTRAK as of 1974 was $1.00, as was the Penn Central
fare. By 1973 the total cumulative operating deficit of PATH for 76a
little over 11 years of operation amounted to over $125 million.

Furthermore, in contrast to the 1962 estimates of $85 million, Port
Authority capital investments in PATH through December 31, 1973,
77
totalled almost $221 million.

Despite these financial problems the PATH system under Port
Authority control became a modern and efficient rail mass transit
system. PATH carries 70% of all passengers entering New York City
78
from New Jersey by rail.
Governors Cahill and Rockefeller, in April 1970, jointly sought
increased Port Authority participation in mass transit and the Governors consequently reached an agreement in November 1972 providing
for a PATH extension to Plainfield via Newark Airport,7 9 direct rail
service for Erie Lackawanna riders into Penn Station in New York,
72. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1973, at 37, col. 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 43, col. 6; Newark Star-Ledger, Feb. 13, 1974, at 7,
col. 2.
76. [1973] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep. 11.
77. Id.
78. [1975] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep. 13.
79. The 1970 program contemplating a PATH extension to Cranford was amended to extend
the line to Plainfield, thus eliminating competition from the Central Railroad of New Jersey and
bringing that project financially within the terms of the 1962 Covenant.
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and direct rail service from Kennedy Airport to Manhattan. The plan
anticipated a Port Authority investment of between $250 and $300
million out of a total projected cost of $650 million. It was also
proposed to eliminate the 1962 Covenant with respect to bonds issued
after the enactment of that legislation. 8"
In December 1972, the New Jersey Senate held an information
session to consider the Governors' proposals. At that session, Port
Authority officials stated that the PATH extension to Plainfield via
Newark Airport was deemed "doable" on a self-supporting basis. It
was therefore within the 1962 Covenant because of an anticipated $150
million in federal grants, $50 million in Port Authority bonds, and a
$40 million advancement from the State of New Jersey, which would
be repaid8 1by the Port Authority from the project's net operating
revenues.
The Governors' 1972 program was enacted into law and the legislation embodying the 1962 Covenant was amended effective May 10,
1973, to repeal the 1962 Covenant
with respect to bonds issued after
82
the date of the legislation.
It soon became apparent that the 1973 prospective repeal of the
Covenant was, for all practical purposes, irrelevant to any plan to
expand the Port Authority's participation in deficit rail mass transit
beyond the Covenant's formula. This was so because, as we have seen,
the Covenant protected all "affected" bonds, which were defined to
include, at the least, consolidated bonds 8 3 issued following the Covenant's enactment and prior to its prospective repeal. The period
from 1962 through 1974 represented the most intensive capital finance
program in the history of public authorities, and the Port Authority
issued almost $1.3 billion in bonds directly protected by the 1962
80.

Information Sess. of N.J. Sen. on Assembly Bills 1564 and 1565 (Port Authority Mass

Transit Bills), 194th Leg., 2d Sess. 5, 7 (Dec. 11, 1972)
81. Id. at 14. On August 10, 1973, the Governor of New Jersey committed the state to

advance up to $40,000,000 for New Jersey's share of the capital cost of the PATH Extension
Project. This advance would have been repaid to the state through net project revenues after
satisfaction of operation, maintenance costs, and debt service charges. Letters from Governor

William T. Cahill to James C. Kellogg, Chairman, The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (Aug. 10, 1973). This commitment was made to enable the Port Authority to construct the

PATH extension to Plainfield within the terms of the 1962 Covenant.
82.

Chs. 207, 208, 1972 N.J. Laws; ch. 1003, 1972 N.Y. Laws; Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,

Official Statement, $100,000,000 Consolidated Bonds, Forty-first Series Due 2008 (First Installment) 17 (Oct. 1, 1973). The introductory statenent appended to the New Jersey bill said that the
bill would prevent the 1962 Covenant from being applied to those who held bonds issued after the
Act became effective. It would, however, maintain the rights of those holding bonds issued after
March 27,

83.

1962, but before the Act was effective.

See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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Covenant. 4 Since these bonds would not mature finally until the year
2007, the Covenant remained in effect notwithstanding its prospective
repeal.8 5 Between the date of the prospective repeal of the Covenant in
May 1973 and its retroactive repeal in June 1974, the Port Authority
sold another $200 million of Consolidated Bonds. 86 The last sale was
in October 1973, an issue of $100 million with an interest coupon of
5-1/2%.87 This was to be the Port Authority's last long-term financing
for almost three years, since upon the Covenant's retroactive repeal the
credit markets were closed to the agency.8 8

MII.

RETROACTIVE REPEAL AND THE
BONDHOLDER LITIGATION

A. The Repeal Legislation and the Institution of Litigation
The bill to repeal the 1962 Covenant retroactively was introduced in
the New Jersey Legislature on February 15, 1974.89 In contrast to the
extensive hearings, reports, and findings surrounding the passage of the
Covenant in 1962 and its prospective repeal in 1973, the repealer in
New Jersey was enacted without legislative fact finding, without
extensive contemporaneous legislative debate, without public hearings
to allow opponents or bondholders to express their positions, without
committee reports, and without amendments to the original bill. Some
legislative colloquy did take place in New York State, when the
sponsor of New York's repealer legislation gave the following dearly
erroneous response to a question raised by one legislator as to the
wisdom of the repealer:
MR. STRELZIN: Mr. Farrell, I am under the impression that the New York Port
Authority Charter provided that if there was a shortage of funds to make necessary
payments to bond holders that money would be supplied by the State of New York on
application to the governmental Comptroller. Am I right, sir?
MR. FARRELL: Both states. 9"

On April 30, 1974, Governor Byrne of New Jersey signed into law
84. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Official Statement, $100,000,000 Consolidated Bonds,
Forty-first Series Due 2008 (First Installment) 17, 24-25, 52 (Oct. 1, 1973).
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. Id.; [1976] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep. 33.
87. Id.
88. The next bond issue by the agency was on July 8, 1976, at an interest coupon of 8.20%
and a net interest cost to the Port Authority of 8.27%. Daily Bond Buyer, July 9, 1976, at 1, col.
2.

89.
90.

A. 1304, 196th N.J. Leg., 1st Sess. (1974).
N.Y. Assembly Transcript 6486, 6496 (1974).
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that state's legislation retroactively repealing the 1962 Covenant. 9' On
the same day the United States Trust Company of New York instituted an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, for
a declaratory judgment that the New Jersey repeal legislation was
unconstitutional. Counsel for United States Trust instituted the suit in
that court with the intention that it would be referred to Judge George
Gelman, who had been hearing the Gaby case, discussed above, 9 2 and
had deferred action on that case pending a resolution of the pressures
for a retroactive repeal of the Covenant.
United States Trust's complaint was brought in three capacities: as
trustee for the fortieth and forty-first series of Port Authority
consolidated bonds, on its own behalf, and as a class representative of
all holders of consolidated bonds of the Port Authority. 93 As of July
13, 1974, the Trust Company held approximately $96,780,000 principal amount of the Port Authority's consolidated bonds of the approximately $1,600,000,000 total amount of such bonds then outstanding.
The bonds held by United States Trust were held for its own account
and in its several fiduciary capacities, including its capacity as trustee
94
or investment manager for hundreds of individual accounts.
95
As discussed above,
concurring bi-state legislation was necessary
to repeal the 1962 Covenant. United States Trust's action in New
Jersey was begun on the day that state's repeal legislation was signed,
on the theory that even one state's retroactive repeal of the Covenant
96
damaged the secondary market for Port Authority bonds.
Efforts by the financial community to convince Governor Wilson not
to sign New York's repealer were unsuccessful, and on June 15, 1974,
the last day on which he could approve the bill, at one minute before
midnight, 97 Governor Wilson signed New York's repeal legislation,
issuing as he did so a remarkable statement:
It is with great reluctance that I approve a bill that overturns a solemn pledge of the
State. I take this extraordinary step only because it will lead to an end of the existing
controversy over the validity of the statutory covenant, a controversy that can only
91.

Ch. 25, 1974 N.J. Laws.

92. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
93. Complaint
1, 5, 7, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d
833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rcv'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Complaint].
94. Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Certification and Expedition, by J. Sinclair
Armstrong 1 4 (May 16, 1975), United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d
833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Affidavit by J. Sinclair Armstrong].
95. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
96. Complaint, supra note 93,
30.
97. N.Y. Daily News, June 17, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
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have an adverse effect upon the administration and financing of the Port Authority,
and because it will lead to a speedy resolution by the courts of the questions and issues
concerning the validity of the statutory covenant. Because it is the province of the
courts to decide questions of constitutionality, I will not prevent the covenant issue
from being brought before them, especially where it is the unanimously expressed
desire of the members of both houses of the New York State Legislature as well as the
expressed will of the Governor and both houses of the Legislature of the State of New
Jersey to do so. 98

On June 17, 1974, the next business day following Governor
Wilson's approval of the New York repealer, United States Trust
instituted litigation in New York seeking a declaration that that state's
repeal violated the federal contract and due process clauses and the
New York due process clause. 99
The existence of parallel lawsuits in both states prompted an almost
immediate problem of whether to press one action over the other or to
prosecute both cases simultaneously. In light of Judge Gelman's familiarity with the complexities of the Port Authority's financial structure
through the Gaby case and upon consideration of the New Jersey cases
which had considered impairment of bond contracts,10 0 it was determined to press the New Jersey litigation while holding the New York
case in readiness to be activated when and if necessary.
The New Jersey defendants answered the United States Trust
complaint on July 15, 1974, denying that the 1974 legislation constituted an unconstitutional impairment of contract or taking of property
and raising several affirmative defenses. Defendants also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the 1974 legislation was in
all respects valid and constitutional. 10 1
United States Trust answered the counterclaim on August 2, 1974,
and denied the substantive allegations of the defendants' affirmative
defenses and counterclaims and set up affirmative defenses, based on
estoppel, laches, and waiver, to the state's challenge to the validity of
10 2
the 1962 Covenant.
98.
99.

Governor's Message on Bills Approved, 1974 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 416.
United States Trust Co. v. State, Index No. 09128174 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 17,

1974).
100. E.g., New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of East Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972); New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Sills, 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d
498 (Ch. Div.), supplemented, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 38 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
101. Answer and Counterclaim (July 15, 1974), United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J.
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
102. Answer to Counterclaim (Aug. 2, 1974), United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J.
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On October 24, 1974, the superior court ordered that the United
States Trust action could be maintained and defended as a class action
under New Jersey Rule 4:32-1(b) (1) and (b) (2) by United States Trust
as representative of a class consisting of all holders of all series of
consolidated bonds of the Port Authority. It was further ordered that
given to the litigation be deemed
the widespread publicity already
10 3
sufficient notice to the class.
On December 10, 1974, the superior court ordered that the Gaby
case be consolidated with United States Trust Company's action,
subject to the conditions that (i) the issues raised by the pleadings in
the United States Trust action would be first determined and only
thereafter, if appropriate, would the court determine the issues raised
by the Gaby litigation and (ii) participation by counsel for plaintiff in
Gaby in the United States Trust case would be limited to those issues
raised by plaintiff in the Gaby litigation which were common to the
United States Trust litigation.104
B. The Stipulation
As a result of negotiations between counsel for United States Trust
and special counsel for New Jersey, a 366-page stipulation of fact was
agreed upon and submitted to the superior court on December 20,
The stipulation first set forth a history of the Port Author1974.105
ity, 10 6 then contained a long summary of New Jersey's public transportation requirements, with discussions of the 1973-1974 energy
crisis and the health and environmental problems in the Port District
which, the state would argue, would be alleviated to some degree by
improved rail mass transit.' 0 7 Next came a broad survey of rapid
transit in the Port District, detailing the countless studies of the
problem, the Port Authority's participation, the takeover of the H&M
in 1962, and the 1971-1972 Governors' Agreement to expand the
agency's0 8 mass transit obligations and repeal the Covenant prospectively. 1
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiant, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
103. Consent Order, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833
(L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiarn, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
104. Order of Consolidation (Dec. 10, 1974), United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J.
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
105. Stipulation, supra note 35.
106. Id. at 1-14.
107. Id. at 15-69.
108. Id. at 70-272.
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The stipulation also put before the superior court the status at the
time of the various federal mass transit programs and the critical mass
transit situation in the Port District. 0 9 It concluded with an overview
of the financial position of the Port Authority, a survey of outstanding
Port Authority bonds, and the history of the repeal legislation.' t0
Eight lengthy exhibits were submitted to the superior court with
the stipulation of fact: (1) New Jersey's then current transit program,"' (2) the latest Port Authority Official Statement," ' 2 (3) the
latest Port Authority Annual Report," 3 (4) a 1970 Audit Report of the
agency, 11 4 (5) a speech detailing the Port Authority's financial structure, ' (6) a 1971 report regarding the Newark and Cranford extensions, 1 6 (7) selected materials from a 1971 hearing regarding the Port
Authority," 7 and (8) the 1972 Information Session held with respect to
the proposed PATH extension.""
C. The Mini-Trial
In addition to the massive record submitted via the stipulation, two
issues in United States Trust were the subject of a mini-trial. Counsel
for defendants were unwilling to stipulate regarding the issues of the
reliance by purchasers of consolidated bonds of the Port Authority on
the 1962 Covenant and the damage to the bondholders in the secondary market for Port Authority consolidated bonds resulting from the
repeal legislation. Accordingly, a trial was held in February 1975 to
secure expert testimony and documentary evidence on these two issues.
That bondholders relied on the Covenant was, it was felt, almost a
foregone conclusion. Following the enactment of the Covenant, the
109.
110.

Id. at 272-94.
Id. at 294-366.

ill.

N.J. Dep't of Transp., Transit Development Program, 1974-1979 (1973).

112. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Official Statement, $100,000,000 Consolidated Bonds,
Forty-first Series Due 2008 (First Installment) (Oct. 1, 1973).
113. 11973] Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Ann. Rep.
114. Division of Audits & Accounts, Office of State Comptroller, Audit Report on Analysis of
Financial Operations, Port of New York Authority, New York, New York (Rep. No. N.Y.
Auth. 8-70).
115. Goldberg History, supra note 47.
116. Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., The Ability of the Port of New York Authority to
Finance and Operate a PATH Extension to Newark Airport and Cranford, New Jersey (prepared
for Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Transp.) (Dec. 1971).
117. Selected Materials from Public Hearings Before the Autonomous Authorities Study
Commission of the New Jersey State Legislature and the New York State Assembly Committee
on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions (Mar. 1971).
118. Information Sess. of N.J. Sen. on Assembly Bills 1564 and 1565 (Port Authority Mass
Transit Bills), 194th Leg., 2d Sess. (Dec. 11,

1972).
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Port Authority issued and sold to the public $1,260,000,000 principal
amount of consolidated bonds. In connection with these financings,
the Port Authority repeatedly emphasized the importance of the Covenant's protection for bondholders to induce potential investors to
purchase consolidated bonds. The Covenant, described to the investment community as a legally enforceable contract,1 19 was discussed in
detail in every official statement after its enactment. It was discussed
at information sessions held to acquaint the investment community
with the protections of the Covenant and the other aspects of proposed
consolidated bond issues. 120 Annual reports of the Port Authority
after 1962 also often referred to the Covenant and its protection for
Port Authority bondholders. The Covenant was discussed extensively
in municipal credit reports published by Standard & Poor's, Moody's
12 1
and other analysts.
Each of the trial witnesses was an acknowledged leader in his area
of the municipal bond business: John F. Thompson (investment banking and investment advisory), Lester Murphy and Austin Fitzgerald
(bond dealers), and Gordon Fowler (institutional investors). Thus,
United States Trust supplied testimony from each of the four major
areas of the municipal bond business.
Gordon Fowler's testimony, for example, as to whether he would
have purchased Port Authority bonds without the Covenant, was as
follows:
Q.

With respect to all the purchases you described [approximately $9-1/2 million of

Port Authority bonds], would you have purchased any of those bonds without the
protection of the covenant?
A. I can't say for certain we would not have purchased them, but if we had, it
would have been at a much lower price for the given coupons.' 22

John F. Thompson testified that the Covenant "was an important and
significant part"'123 of what he presumed he was buying for his clients,
and that he would not have recommended purchase of Port 1Authority
24
bonds if he knew the Covenant would later be repealed.
The importance of the existence of the 1962 Covenant for purchasers
119.

Stenographic Transcript, vol. 1, at 58-59, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J.

Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiant, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),

rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Record].
120. Id. at 61-64; Stipulation, supra note 35, at 216, 330-35.
121. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Exhibits P-l, P-2, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super.
124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431
U.S. 1 (1977).
122. Record, supra note 119, vol. 4, at 765.
123. Id. vol. 1, at 82.

124.

Id. vol. 1, at 83.
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of the fortieth and forty-first series of consolidated bonds (issued
following the 1973 prospective repeal) was also testified to by Gordon
Fowler, who stated that Connecticut General purchased $3,000,000 of
the Fortieth Series in reliance on the 1962 Covenant even though it
had been prospectively repealed:
Q. Now, with respect to the 1973 purchase of bonds, did you purchase those bonds
with the knowledge of the 1973 prospective repeal of the 1962 covenant?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Would you explain that decision?
A. Well, the 40th series bonds which we purchased were not covered by the
covenant. However, of [sic] approximately a billion seven, thereabouts, of outstanding
Port Authority bonds, were protected by the covenant and it to me was unreasonable
to expect that these bonds would be fully retired in the immediate future or even the
foreseeable future and therefore the 40th series bonds were indirectly protected by the
covenant. 1s

The deposition of J. Sinclair Armstrong, Executive Vice President of
United States Trust, was taken prior to the mini-trial. An exhibit to
Mr. Armstrong's deposition 126 was a memorandum dated April 27,

1961, from an investment officer of United States Trust to all officers
and account executives of the investment division, which raised the
question of future marketability of Port Authority bonds in light of
attempts to involve the Port Authority in deficit rail mass transit. The
memorandum referred to the 1961 New York legislation under which
the Port Authority would have acquired the H&M and specifically
noted:
The act passed by the New York State Legislature provides for no limits on either
the revenues or the General Reserve Fund balances for use in the Hudson and
Manhattan Railroad acquisition. Without such a provision, the present security behind
Port bonds is weakened to a considerable degree. It is prudent to assume that even
with the acquisition by a capable group of administrators such as the Port Commissioners, the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad will operate at a deficit until some major
improvement in use of this facility occurs.
It is further disturbing to note that the Governor of the State of New York in his
memorandum of approval leaves little doubt that it is his thinking and that of his
advisers that no guarantee be given to the bondholders of Port Authority obligations.
There is further indication that suggests the Governor is contemplating future
addi27
tional acquisitions of other commuter railroads by the Port Authority.1

The memorandum concluded with the announcement of a change in
28
policy-no additional Port Authority bonds were to be purchased.
125. Id. vol. 4, at 764-65.
126. Plaintiff's Exhibit S-3, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d
833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
127. Id.

128.

Id.
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Thus, the largest single purchaser of Port Authority bonds ceased to
purchase any more bonds solely as a result of the possibility that the
Port Authority might be directed to become involved in deficit rail
operations without any limitation.
The damage to the secondary market caused by the retroactive
repeal of the 1962 Covenant was evidenced by the "thinness" of the
market for Port Authority bonds and by the decline in prices for Port
Authority bonds following repeal. Where Port Authority bonds prior to
repeal were readily marketable in large amounts at the generally
quoted bid prices, after the repeal the market for Port Authority bonds
became "extremely thin" and "sensitive" so that a sale of a large block
of the bonds could not be made at the current bid price but only at a
price substantially below it. 129 Also as a result of repeal, the price of

Port Authority bonds fell dramatically in the secondary market relative
to other bonds formerly considered comparable in quality and intrinsic
security. 130
Mr. Thompson testified:
The market has been adversely effected [sic] by the repeal. It is not possible to
measure the adverse effect simply by comparing market prices I believe.
There was a time before the repeal when Port Authority bonds traded in the market
very much as some of the other Authorities, major Authorities [or] State bonds do.
And if a bank or insurance company with a five million dollar holding of those bonds
came to a dealer and said: I want to sell these; what will you bid? He could get a bid
that would be pretty much in line with the quoted market.
What we have now is a market that is unusually thin .... 131
You could get a flow into the market by one of two things. One would be a brand
new issue coming into the market. The other would be some investor who decided not
to go along with this type of advice, but to sell his five or ten million dollar holdings.
In my opinion in either one of those events the bid
for the bonds would be
32
substantially below the market as it is quoted today.'

Mr. Thompson further testified that if the market were confronted
with "large volume sales" of Port Authority bonds the prices for such
bonds "would dip considerably further. ' 133 Finally, Mr. Thompson
agreed with the trial court's observation that:
THE COURT: With such a thin market for these bonds as you have described It
129. Record, supra note 119, vol. 1, at 92-94, 128, 153. The expert witnesses testified
that
the market for Port Authority bonds since the repeal was "unusually thin" (Mr. Thompson,
Record, supra note 119, vol. 2, at 407, 438), and "very thin and very sensitive" (Mr. Fitzgerald,
Record, supra note 119, vol. 4, at 728).
130. Id. vol. 1, at 117, 130, 162.
131.
132.
133.

Id. vol. 1, at 92-93.
Id. vol. 1, at 93-94.
Id. vol. 1, at 128.
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after the repeal of the covenant, wouldn't the offer of a relatively small quantity of
bonds have a greater effect upon the price that [sic] would otherwise be the case?
34
THE WITNESS: I suspect that is true, yes.'

Mr. Murphy's testimony on this point was tb the same effect: "[W]e
found that subsequent to this repeal of the covenant, that most of the
major institutions that we did business with, and I wouldn't say most,
I don't know of any that would then buy Port Authority bonds. They
' 135
crossed it off their list.
Repeal of the Covenant also had an indirect adverse effect on the
market for other obligations of agencies of the states of New Jersey and
New York. 13 6 In fact, several large institutions refused to purchase
any bonds of any agencies of either of the two states as a result of the
137
repeal of the Covenant.
On the eve of the mini-trial Judge Gelman had requested that a Port
Authority financial expert be made available to testify with respect to
the relative importance of the Covenant as protection for bondholders
as compared to the other bondholder covenants which remained
unimpaired. In response to this request Michael Zarin, Esq., Chief of
the Finance Division of the Law Department of the Port Authority,
134. Id. vol. 1, at 153.
135. Id. vol. 2, at 399. Mr. Murphy's characterization of repeal had the eloquence of the
marketplace: "No, I think that the fears, I think rve previously testified to, is that it's a-it's an
abrogation of an agreement, it's a contract. It's as if I went and bought a car from General
Motors and had a twelve month warranty, and all of a sudden they announced that it's only good
for six months. I don't think that I'd buy another General Motors car. And I think this is the
feeling in the investment community." Id. vol. 2, at 435.
136. Id. vol. 1, at 87; vol. 2, at 411-12; vol. 4, at 767. Mr. Thompson testified in part: "The
repeal of the covenant was recommended by the Governor of New Jersey approximately one
week after sale of the $300 million Sports Complex issue. That issue was saleable at the time only
because the Legislature had added the so-called moral obligation to its commitment.
"In my opinion-and I have heard no professional investment person who disagreed with this;
in my opinion if that recommendation by the Governor had been made one week before the sale
of the Sports Complex bonds instead of one week after, the bonds would not have been saleable,
because the investment community was saying about the repeal of the covenant, and has said
about it- If a legal covenant can be repealed by the States, what confidence can we place in their
moral obligation?
"We have run onto this in an even broader field. My firm was the number two manager in a
syndicate which last week underwrote $150 million and sold them of Power Authority bonds of
the State of New York.
"Now the Power Authority is not dependent upon a moral obligation. It is dependent on its
own revenues which are from the sale of electric power. It is about as far removed from any
emotional, or as far removed from the feeling I just stated as anything could be. And yet we
found in several parts of the country that there were many institutional investor portfolio
managers who had themselves adopted or their investment committees had adopted a rule that
there be no further investment in anything in New York State or New Jersey due to the repeal of
the covenant." Id. vol. 1, at 86-87.
137. Id. vol. 1, at 87; vol. 4, at 767.
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after reviewing the history of the Port Authority's financial structure,
outlined the objective importance of the Covenant vis-h-vis the other
tests and agreements contained in relevant statutes, in the Consolidated Bond Resolution, and in the resolutions establishing each series
of consolidated bonds.
Mr. Zarin first discussed the so-called "1.3 test" contained in section
3, condition 3 of the Consolidated Bond Resolution.138 He testified to
the effect that considering only the 1.3 test it would be possible for the
Port Authority to issue bonds to finance a takeover of a new facility
which was certain to suffer massive operating deficits, because the
expected deficits of the facility would not be included in the 1.3
calculation. Mr. Zarin said:
[T~he 1.3 test may be protective in certain very limited cases, but as I have examined
it, I do not believe that it is protective against operating deficits. It is not protective in
the situation . . . outlined initially, namely the assumption of operation of a new
facility and if I take protection to mean ...protection of the security [of] bondholders,
therefore it would not be protective in that situation and it would not be protective in
my judgment in the event of the takeover [of] an existing facility, if one were to
approach that facility with the objective of 39
bringing that facility within what we
would call the general reserve fund family.'

In addition, it should be recalled that section 7 of the series
resolutions (since the 12th series) prohibits the use of any consolidated
bond reserve funds to pay the operating deficits of a facility acquired
unless such a facility is acquired or constructed through the issuance of
an obligation secured by the General 140
Reserve Fund and the proceeds
are used for that additional facility.
The second part of section 7 contains the so-called "section 7
certification," which must be made by the Commissioners of the Port
Authority at or prior to the time of the issuance of consolidated bonds
for a new purpose. The section 7 certification need only be made in
connection with an issuance of bonds to finance a new facility. For
example, the recent Newark Airport improvements, requiring Port
Authority expenditures of over $400,000,000, did not require a section
7 certification since no "additional" facility was involved. 14 1 Further138.

CBR, supra note 49, section 3, condition 3. The 1.3 test applies only when a series of

consolidated bonds is issued by the Port Authority. It prohibits such issuance unless the best
twelve months' net revenues (of the preceding thirty-six months) of all of the Port Authority's
facilities are equal to or greater than 1.3 times the prospective debt service for the calendar year
in the future during which the debt service of all outstanding and proposed new bonds secured by
the General Reserve Fund would be at a maximum. Id.; s'e text accompanying note 50 supra.
139.

Record, supra note 119, vol. 3, at 543.

140. E9.g., Resolution Establishing Forty-first Series of Consolidated Bonds, supra note 51,
§ 7.
141. This example was felt to have additional importance since the definition of "air
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more, the section 7 certification requires only a certification of the
opinion of the Commissioners. This opinion must only say that there
will be no materialimpairment of the Port Authority's credit standing,
or the investment status of its bonds, or its ability to fulfill its
commitments to bondholders. It does not block any impairment; it
blocks only an impairment which is material in the opinion of the Port
Authority's Commissioners. 14 2 The 1962 Covenant, by contrast, does
not contain the words "opinion" or "material."
Unlike the section 7 certification, the 1962 Covenant required certification of an ascertainable amount and not merely an opinion of the
Commissioners of the Port Authority. Because of PATH's losses,
authorization in compliance with the Covenant was limited only to
"self-supporting" rail mass transit facilities. Self-supporting was
defined by the statute to mean that revenues should be at least equal to
1 43
operating and maintenance expenses and debt service.
An important distinction between a section 7 certification and a
Covenant certification is that the latter requires considerably more
precision. The section 7 certification permits a general certification as
to whether the Port Authority can support a proposed facility by
utilizing the projected revenues from its whole family of facilities. There
is thus a great deal of room for a range in the projections under section
7; the 1962 Covenant certification relates solely to the projected net
revenues from a single proposed facility leaving considerably less
leeway for error.
As Mr. Thompson testified:
THE WITNESS: The covenant is that they must certify that the project will, one,
141
be self supporting ....
Now, self supporting, your Honor-although it sounds as though it can be a
qualitative phrase is not, at least not in our business.
Self supporting means that the revenues shall be estimated to be at least as much as
the operating expenses plus the debt service which is a mathematical requirement that
does not appear in Section 7, which only requires certification that it will not
materially impair and that's what I meant by more precise."-4'

For example, under the section 7 certification the Commissioners
terminals" had been amended by the legislature to include rail mass transit connections between
Port Authority airports and New York City. Stipulation, supra note 35, Ex. 1I, at 17. It was thus
arguable that the proposed rail links to Kennedy Airport and Newark Airport and beyond to
Plainfield would not require any certification under section 7.
142. "To us, this [the section 7 certification] was merely a contractual codification of an
agreement and obligation which we had anyhow. .. ." Goldberg History, supra note 47, at 23.
143. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
144. Record, supra note 119, vol. 1, at 78.
145. Id. vol. 1, at 80-81.
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could certainly look to an anticipated growth in revenues of existing
facilities to determine whether issuance of the consolidated bonds for

an additional facility would be a material impairment of the sound
credit standing of the Port Authority. Under the Covenant test,

however, the Commissioners would be required to examine but a
single facility and would not be allowed to speculate regarding increased revenues from the other facilities operated by the Port Author-

ity.
D. Post-Trial Briefs and Oral Argument
The parties exchanged post-trial briefs on March 10, 1975. United
States Trust's brief, 14 6 after reviewing the history of the case and the
trial, began its legal argument with the contract clause analysis by
stating the two constitutional provisions involved: the contract clause
of the Federal Constitution, 14 7 and of the New Jersey Constitution. 148
The brief then reviewed the creation of the Covenant as a binding
obligation of the states. The Covenant by its terms created a contract

between the states of New York and New Jersey and the holders of

Port Authority bonds. 14 9 Furthermore, each consolidated bond states
that it is issued "in conformity with the compact . . . and the various
statutes of [New Jersey and New York] amendatory thereof and
supplemental thereto," which included the 1962 legislation by which
the Covenant was enacted. Finally, the adoption of the 1962 legislation
and the reliance upon it by bondholders in purchasing their bonds was
sufficient to create a contract between the states and the bondholders
even absent the express language of the Covenant. 150
146. Brief for Plaintiff, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833
(L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as United States Trust's Trial Brief]; Post-Trial Memorandum for Defendants,
United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, J38 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), qff'd per
curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (hereinafter cited as
Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum].
147.

"No State shall ...

pass any ...

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ..

" U.S.

Const. art. I, § 10, cI. 1.
148. "The Legislature shall not pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, or
depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was
made." N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, 3; see Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of
East Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972); New Jersey
Highway Auth. v. Sills, 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), supplemented, 111 N.J.
Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
149. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.55 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6606 (McKinney
1961).
150. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 48-55; see, e.g., Indiana v. Brand,
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That the 1962 Covenant would be binding upon future legislatures
was specifically recognized by both New Jersey and New York when it
was enacted in 1962. The Farley Committee concluded that the
Covenant would be a "constitutionally-protected" statutory agreement. 15 1 Governor Rockefeller of New York, in approving the 1961
New York legislation authorizing the takeover of the H&M by the Port
Authority without a statutory covenant protecting bondholders, said:
It was urged by some persons that this bill incorporate a guarantee to bondholders of
the Port Authority either prohibiting or severely restricting any future action by the
two states to authorize any railroad operations by the Port Authority other than the
Hudson Tubes. In support of the proposal it was argued that it would insure the sound
credit of the Port Authority. Its effect, however, would have been to tie the hands of the
Legislatures of New York and New Jersey for all future time, or at least until the
retirement of the bonds to which the guarantee was applicable.
Such a guarantee or fence is undesirable because it is based upon the premise that
we are here and now qualified to predict what will be sound policy decades in the
future-and with such self-assurance that we are willing to make irrevocable decisions
for the future absolutely binding upon our successors. The events of the last three
decades confirm the unsoundness of any such premise.
Article VI of the Port Compact of 1921 provides that the Port Authority "shall
constitute a body, both corporate and politic, with full power and authority to
purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility"
within the Port of New York District. I see no reason for New York and New Jersey
to place an irrevocable limitation at this time upon such power and authority.1s5

The next year, New York changed its position and approved the
legislation containing the 1962 Covenant. Governor Rockefeller evidently was willing to bind "our successors" in order to save the H&M
which was deemed "essential to prevent the economic strangulation of
' 15 3
metropolitan New York.
United States Trust then argued that the obligation of a contract
was impaired by any change in its terms, citing Planters' Bank v.
Sharp,15 4 where the Supreme Court said:
One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its value has by legislation
been diminished. It is not, by the Constitution, to be impaired at all. This is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its
obligation, dispensing with any part of its force. s
303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750 (1884); New Jersey v. Yard,
95 U.S. 104, 115 (1877); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 165 (1812); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-39 (1810).
151. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
152. Governor's Memorandum, 1961 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 421, 423-24.
153. Governor's Memorandum, 1962 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 310, 323.
154. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 300 (1848).
155. Id. at 326-27 (footnote omitted); accord, Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 10S U.S. 278 (1881)
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New Jersey's courts had also interpreted broadly the concept of
"impairment,"' 5 6 and it was primarily because of two New Jersey
Supreme Court cases that counsel for United States Trust had determined to press the New Jersey case in preference to the parallel
litigation in New York. In New Jersey Highway Authority v. Sills, 157
the New Jersey Highway Authority had sold bonds to finance construction of its toll roads, pledging the revenues as security for the
bonds. Subsequently, the legislature exempted certain members of the
National Guard and the United States Armed Forces from the payment of tolls when going to or returning from active duty.
The Highway Authority and two banks which were trustees for
bondholders under the Authority's bond resolutions attacked the toll
exemption statutes as an unconstitutional impairment of the bondholders' contract and a deprivation of their property without just compensation. Authority bonds were outstanding in the amount of approximately $327,000,000; annual net revenues from highway operation
were $33,312,885 and total bond service costs were $17,816,740. The
annual revenue loss from the free passage of guardsmen and reservists was estimated at $27,300, which the trial court observed was
very small when contrasted with the margin of about $15,500,000 left
from net revenues the previous year, after providing for bond service
costs. The trial court also stated that it did not foresee any possibility
that the statutory toll-free passage would ever cause a default on
outstanding bonds, but it found some disadvantageous impact from
the reduction of the means to retire bonds each year by call or open
market purchase. 158 The trial court concluded that the resulting deterioration in the position of every bondholder constituted a sufficient
conflict with the constitutional prohibitions against impairment to
render the statutes void. The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted
the holding and unanimously affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. 159

In the second case, New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v.
McCrane, 160 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reaffirmed its decision
(bond contract); Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880) (bond contract); Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866) (bond contract); Hawthorne v. Calef, 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) 10 (1864); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
156. E.g., Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N.J.L. 596, 599, 169 A. 177, 178 (E.&A.
1933); Baldwin v. Flagg, 43 N.J.L. 495, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
157. 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), supplemented, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268
A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
158.

111 N.J. Super. at 315-16, 268 A.2d at 309-10.

159. 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
160. 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of East Rutherford v. New
Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
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in Sills and emphasized the importance of the duty of the judiciary to
protect from impairment covenants relating to bonds of public authorities. There, revenue bonds were to be issued by the Sports
Authority under a statutory pledge for their payment out of revenues
generated solely by the Authority's operation, which revenues were to
remain in a special fund for that purpose until the bonds were fully
paid. In discussing the obligation created by the bonds, the court said:
The principles applied in Sills are equally applicable here, and it may be stated
definitively that the bonds of the Authority in the hands of purchasers constitute valid
contracts binding on the State according to their terms, and are entitled to the same
constitutional protection against impairment at the hands of subsequent Legislatures as
are the bonds of the Educational Facilities Authority, NJ.S.A. 18A: 72A-10, 19, of the
New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency, NJ.S.A. 17:lB-10(g), 17, and of any other
similarly constituted agency created for the performance of a public purpose whose
bonds are supported by a like pledge of the State. Moreover, aside from the strict
applicability of constitutional principles, having in mind our form of government, we
believe the integrity of the legislative branch to be such that a succeeding Legislature
would not undertake to impair in any material fashion a solemn pledge made in good
faith to bondholders by a predecessor Legislature.
. . . And if the constitutionally acceptable device of modern day progressive
government, i.e., the financially independent authority, is to succeed in the expeditious
accomplishment of public purpose projects, and in persuading investors to buy the
authority's bonds, the good faith covenant of the Legislature for itself and its
successors to refrain from adopting later enactments which will materially impair the
obligation of the authority's bonds must be respected. Otherwise the device becomes
an empty formula. The judicial branch of government, which has given its imprimatur
to the constitutionality of the device, 6 has the duty to declare invalid attempts at
material subversion of the covenant.' '

The United States Trust brief argued that the fears of the court in
Sports Authority as to the damage to bondholder confidence by subsequent legislation materially impairing an obligation of contract had
actually been realized, not only in the decline in the secondary market

for Port bonds but also in the change of attitude of members of the
financial community toward the "moral obligation" bonds of the two
states. 162 The brief also countered the expected argument by the state
that the 1974 legislation repealing the 1962 Covenant did not impair
any obligation of contract because the legislation did not repeal the
primary obligation of the Port Authority to its bondholders, the
obligation to pay interest and principal when due, and did not affect
163
the other security provisions relating to protection for bondholders.
161. Id. at 28-29, 292 A.2d at 558-59.
162. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 67-68; Record, supra note 119, vol.
1, at 87; vol. 2, at 411-12; vol. 4, at 767.
163. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 68-69; see, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co.

v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 156 Me. 131, 136
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Assuming for the sake of argument that the police power applied to
contracts of the type of the 1962 Covenant, United States Trust's trial
brief then contended that repeal could not be
justified as an exercise of
64
the police power under applicable federal1 and New Jersey cases. 165
In this connection, several basic arguments were made by United
States Trust. There was the evident distinction between public and
private contracts, with courts traditionally devoting more care and
attention to the former. 1 66 The brief then sought to distinguish the
three leading Supreme Court cases which had upheld a contractual
impairment as a proper exercise of the police power. The first, Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,1 67 is the modern foundation of
contract clause adjudication. In Blaisdell the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law, a depression remedy which allowed judicial extensions of foreclosure redemption periods, was upheld because it was a
temporary measure prompted by great emergency, required compensation to the aggrieved mortgagee, and was the only means to accomplish the objective. All of these factors, it was argued, were absent
168
from the case in issue.
The second leading case, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
Asbury Park, 169 sustained a creditor-approved composition plan for a
A.2d 699 (1957); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973); ef. Jacksonville Port
Auth. v. State, 161 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1964) (1963 statute directing city to transfer to port
authority all dock and terminal facilities and accept in payment the authority's bonds held not to
impair obligation of contract of city with holders of 1941 bonds exchanged for 1913 bonds Issued
to acquire or construct the facilities); City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole,
Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.2d 637, appeal
dismissed sub nom. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. City of New Bedford, 358 U.S. 53 (1958)
(act creating steamship authority did not create such a contract between the state and the
authority that its impairment would violate the contract clause).
164. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 84-92; see, e.g., City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502
(1942); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
165. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 81-84; see, e.g., New Jersey Sports
& Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1,292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nora. Borough of
East Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972); New Jersey
Highway Auth. v. Sills, 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), supplemented, 111 N.J.
Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd per euriam, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971);
P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Comm'r, Dep't of Transp., 60 N.J. 308, 288 A.2d 574 (1972); Hourigan
v. Township of North Bergen, 113 N.J.L. 143, 150-51, 172 A. 193, 197 (E.&A. 1934).
166. See, e.g., New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885);
Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 116 (1863). Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), with
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
167. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
168. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 87-90.
169. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
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bankrupt city and was distinguished
since it involved a ratification of a
170
debt, not its repudiation.
The third case, City of El Paso v. Simmons, 171 cut short the right of
defaulting land purchasers to reinstate their ownership rights, a practice which lead unexpectedly to rampant speculative abuse and uncertainty with respect to land titles. There, unlike United States Trust,
the promise was not a sine qua non of the investment and the case
72
involved an unforeseeable change in circumstances.
The basic point of the United States Trust brief was that the repeal
was inherently unreasonable. Money, and only money, was at stake,
and evident alternatives existed for the states to realize their goals
1 73
without so crushing an intrusion on the rights of bondholders.
Defendants had quite a different view of the matter. The state first
reviewed in great detail the 1973-74 energy crisis, the health and
environmental situation in the Port District, and the urgent need for
more and improved public transportation in the area,1 74 all facts
which no one seriously could contest. They then argued that the 1962
Covenant in effect added nothing to the protections for bondholders
which preceded its enactment, and that credit rating agencies and
analysts had paid little heed to the Covenant in assessing Port Author175
ity security.
Defendants' key factual argument, with which their legal argument
was irrevocably intertwined, was based on a hypothetical supposition
as of the date of their trial brief. They made the appealing argument
that the Port Authority could be delegated responsibility for capital
costs of rail projects such as the PATH extension to Plainfield (with the
state assuming responsibility for operating losses) and raise the revenues necessary to cover debt service on the construction bonds by a
modest increase in tolls on the Port Authority's Hudson River crossings. 17 6 No one supposed then that this was exactly what the Port
170. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 91-92.
171. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
172. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 92-98.
173. The brief concluded with the point that the repeal was a taking of property in violation
of the federal and New Jersey due process clauses. United States Trust's Trial Brief, supra note
146, at 122; see Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Hale, The Supreme Court and
the Contract Clause: II1, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 890-91 (1944); cf. City of El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497, 517, 533-35 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (a state should compensate an individual
for impairing his contract right); 51 Va. L. Rev. 692 (1965). Finally, the brief distinguished the
Gaby case and argued that the Covenant was constitutional in all respects. United States Trust's
Trial Brief, supra note 146, at 117-21.
174. Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 146, at 3-30.
175. Id. at 31-76.
176. Id. at 26-30.
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Authority would agree to do on the eve of the trial court decision.
Based on their view of the facts, defendants concluded that repeal of
the Covenant, on balance, was a patently reasonable exercise of the
police power. To them there was no diminution in security, since the
remaining bondholder protections adequately grounded the "basic"
obligation to pay principal and interest. 177 The market damage, they
argued, was due to many causes and only resulted from a lack of
understanding of how little the Covenant added to bondholder protection. 178 Balanced against the need for mass transit to solve the critical
energy and environmental
problems the Covenant, to defendants, had
79
to give way.1
On April 1, 1975, the parties exchanged reply briefs, 180 which
summarized the case as follows:
For United States Trust:
The heart of defendants' argument is that, on balance, the interests of the State
outweigh the interests of Bondholders. On the State's side, defendants point to the
purported energy and environmental problems which the repeal of the Covenant will
allegedly solve. We have already demonstrated that consideration of these problems
played no part in the repeal of the Covenant and that the problems would not be
solved by the repeal. As for the mass transportation problem, we have demonstrated
that (a) the repeal of the Covenant will be ineffectual in the solution of the problem,
and (b) there were other means available to the State for approaching a solution to the
problem which would not have involved any impairment of Bondholder security.
On the Bondholders' side, it has been clearly demonstrated that they have suffered
substantial damage as a result of the repeal of the Covenant, which was a primary
inducement for their purchase of Consolidated Bonds, and that they have been
deprived of a protection guaranteed to them by a solemn promise of the State.
It is clear from the foregoing that the interest of the State in the repeal of the
Covenant is miniscule and misplaced, and the interest of the Bondholders, actual and
substantial. The balance clearly lies in favor of the Bondholders. It is submitted
further that the interest of the State must be found to be overpowering before the
Court should permit it to repudiate its own statutory pledge.' 8 '
177. Id.
178. Id. at 104-13. Since there was, to defendants, no impairment of contract, there was no
taking of property in contravention of the due process clauses.
179. Id. The remainder of defendants' brief was devoted to an argument that the Covenant
was void ab initio as in conflict with the Port Authority Compact and that it should be declared
invalid as inconsistent with superseding federal law. Id at 119-44. Since the superior court
upheld repeal, it never reached this issue. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124,
198, 338 A.2d 833, 875 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd,
431 U.S. 1 (1977).
180. Reply Brief for Plaintiff, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338
A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief of United States Trust]; Defendants' Reply Memorandum,
United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Defendants' Reply Memorandum].
181. Reply Brief of United States Trust, supra note 180, at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
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And for the state:
No hard and fast distinction is appropriate between legislative power over State
contracts and power over private ones, and the Supreme Court has never drawn one.
The reality is that in many cases, including this one, the practical necessity for on-going
relationships with the community arguably disadvantaged by legislative modification
of prior State promises assures that their claims receive especially close attention.
Precisely because the legislature has to weigh the competing interests of the bondholder
community closely in deciding whether repeal is necessary, the judgment is one
warranting maximum judicial respect. In summary, on this point, under the balancing
test applicable here, the repeal of the covenant, a matter collateral to the obligation of
the bonds, does not materially impair any obligation of the contract.' 8-

On April 8 and 9, 1975, the case was argued before Judge Gel-

man. 183 At various points during the argument it became evident that
Judge Gelman seemed satisfied, as a practical matter, with the basic
bondholder protections and viewed the Covenant as arguably super84
fluous to the basic objective of protection of principal and interest.'
It seemed then that the court would be unwilling to find any blow less
than mortal an impairment of contract. Once again defendants raised
the hypothetical supposition of a fare increase, with the "new" revenues going to mass transit, as a rational plan which the Covenant
precluded.185 It was also clear that the court had the greatest18interest
in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh1 8 6 and its application. 7
On April 10, 1975, the day following conclusion of oral argument,
the Port Authority made an announcement that turned the case around
in mid-stream. It proposed a toll increase on the Hudson crossings
expected to net $39 million in additional annual revenues to the
agency, to be used for four mass transit-related projects: (I) the
expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal; (2) the extension of
PATH to Plainfield; (3) the rail link to Kennedy Airport; and (4) direct
rail service for Erie Lackawanna trains into Penn Station, New
York.1 88 The agency almost seemed to be quoting from the state's
briefs in its press release announcing the toll increases: "The new toll
structure is in line with efforts to reduce inefficient and unnecessary
182.

Defendants' Reply Memorandum, supra note 180, at 41.

183. Transcript of Proceedings, vols. I & 2, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super.
124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rer'd, 431

U.S. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Trial Argument Transcript).
184.
185.

See id. vol. 1, at 18-30, 45, 61-63, 66-72, 76-82, 89-96; vol. 2, at 4-6.
See id. vol. 1, at 116, 131-33, 136-37, 153-54; vol. 2, at 14-16.

186.

295 U.S. 56 (1935).

187. Trial Argument Transcript, supra note 183, vol. 1, at 161-73. Most of the second day's
argument was devoted to the Gaby case, which the court never reached. Id. vol. 2, at 43-234.
188. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., News Release 1-2 (Apr. 10, 1975).
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usage, highway congestion, air pollution, and to conserve
automobile
89
fuel.",'
What had been mere supposition and hypothesis in the state's
briefs1 90 was now reality. Where before diversions of revenues for rail
purposes in violation of the Covenant clearly would have required
diversion of current revenues, now the state was free to argue, as it did
hypothetically in its trial briefs, that only "new" revenues would be
called on to finance the proposed rail projects.
E. The Superior Court Decision
One month following announcement of the toll increases the superior
court upheld the retroactive repeal of the 1962 Covenant. 19 1 In its
ninety-five page decision the court combined its findings of fact from
the February trial with its resulting conclusions of law.
With respect to bondholders' reliance on the Covenant the superior
court, apparently with an eye to dicta in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 192 found that the Covenant was not the "primary consideration"
for the purchase of the bonds, "for no witness testified that purchases
would not have been made without the covenant, but only that they
would not have purchased or recommended the purchase of the bonds
'at the price which they were then offered.' "193
With respect to secondary market damage, the court found a
problem in the proofs presented by plaintiff in that "they [did] not
show that the adverse effect attributable to the covenant repeal was
permanent, ' 194 since it happened that the spread between the comparison bonds at the time of trial had closed to where it stood just prior
to repeal. 19 s The court also found that certain newspaper articles
adverse to the Port Authority which had been entered into evidence by
defendants "unquestionably" contributed to the adverse price differential. 196 The court concluded:
The bottom line of plaintiffs proofs on this issue is simply that the evidence fails to
demonstrate that the secondary market price of Authority bonds was adversely
189.

Id. at 2.

190. See text accompanying notes 176 & 185 supra.
191. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (L. Div. 1975), ff'd
per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
192. 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965).
193. 134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864. This conclusion was flatly contradicted by the
record. John F. Thompson had testified in part: "Q. If you knew that the covenant would later be
repealed would you have recommended the Port Authority bonds during the '60s? A. No."
Record, supra note 119, at 86.
194. 134 N.J. Super. at 180, 338 A.2d at 865.
195. Id. at 180-81, 338 A.2d at 865.
196. Id. at 181, 338 A.2d at 865.
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affected by the repeal of the covenant, except for a short-term fall-off in price, the effect
of which97has now been dissipated insofar as it can be related to the enactment of the
repeal. 1

Notwithstanding its conclusions with respect to reliance and second-

ary market damage, on the issue of impairment the court agreed that
"[tlo the extent that the repeal of the covenant authorizes the Authority
to assume greater deficits for such purposes, it permits a diminution of
the pledged revenues and reserves and may be said to constitute an
impairment of the states' contract with the bondholders."1 98 Thus
finding an impairment in the potential diminution in security, but also
concluding that the Covenant was not the "primary inducement" for
the purchase of the bonds and that the secondary market damage was
ephemeral, the superior court set forth an analysis of the origins and
development of the contract clause. 199 As indicated during oral argument, 200 the court placed primary reliance on W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh,20 1 reading the case as follows:
As the language of the court in the cases cited above makes manifest, not every
impairment of a contract obligation or security for its performance runs afoul of the
Contract Clause; a state acting under its reserved police powers may alter its remedial
processes and thereby diminish contractual security provided it does not destroy its
quality as "an acceptable investment for a rational investor." 20 2
The line of demarcation between Blaisdell and Kavanaugh may be expressed as one
of degree: The states' inherent power to protect the public welfare may be validly
exercised under the Contract
Clause even if it impairs a contractual obligation so long
20 3
as it does not destroy it.
Conceding the existence of some impairment of bondholder security as a result of the
repeal, has the action of the states destroyed the quality of their security as an
"acceptable investment for a rational investor"? 204
It is the judgment of this court that the repeal legislation was a reasonable and hence
valid exercise of the states' police power which is not2 0prohibited
by the Contract
-S
Clause of either the Federal or the State Constitution.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 181-82, 338 A.2d at 866.
Id. at 183, 338 A.2d at 866 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 184-93, 338 A.2d at 867-72.

200. See text accompanying note 187 supra.
201. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
202. 134 N.J. Super. at 187, 338 A.2d at 869.
203. Id. at 190, 338 A.2d at 170-71.
204. Id. at 195-96, 338 A.2d at 873-74.
205. Id. at 197, 338 A.2d at 874. Since it upheld the repeal, the court never reached the issue of
the constitutional validity of the Covenant. The Gaby complaint was dismissed. 134 N.J. Super.
at 198, 338 A.2d at 875 (citing Wagner v. Ligham, 37 N.J. Super. 430, 117 A.2d 516 (App. Div.
1955)).
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IV. THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
The day following the superior court decision the secondary market
for Port Authority 6% consolidated bonds fell by more than three
points ($30 per $1,000 principal amount of bonds); this one day of
market loss represented six months' interest on the bonds. 20 6 The Port
Authority, which had been considering its first bond issue since
October of 1973, put those plans back on the shelf, thus continuing the
longest period 207
in modern Port Authority history without a long-term
debt issuance.
On May 16, 1975, counsel for United States Trust filed a motion and
supporting papers with the New Jersey Supreme Court seeking to skip
the intermediate appellate level and secure direct and expedited review
of the superior court decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 20 8
It was felt that the court which decided the New Jersey Sports20 9 and
the Sills 210 cases would not stand for the abrogation of an important
bond covenant.
Only hours after the papers requesting direct certification and expedition were filed, the New Jersey Supreme Court met in an
emergency session in Morristown, New Jersey, where the justices were
attending a judicial conference, and granted the speedy review requested. 2 11 Chief Justice Hughes announced at that time that he would
was Governor of New Jersey when the Coverecuse himself since21 he
2
enacted.
was
nant
The swift action of the supreme court had a decidedly calming effect
on the market for Port bonds, and it was widely thought that the quick
decision on the appeal procedure was a sure sign that the court was
disposed toward reversal. One interested bondholder was so optimistic
that it published a rave analysis of the Port Authority on the eve of
filing of the appellate briefs. This was Barr Brothers, the municipal
bond dealer firm from which United States Trust had chosen one of
its expert witnesses, Lester Murphy. On June 12, 1975, Barr Brothers
published a Port Authority investment analysis titled The Reports of
My Death are Greatly Exaggerated,21 3 which said, in part, that not206. Affidavit by J. Sinclair Armstrong, supra note 94, at 4.
207. See Letter from Patrick J. Falvey to Hon. Robert B. Meyner (May 15, 1975).
208. Newark Star-Ledger, May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
209. 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972).
210. 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
211. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 41, col. 1.
212. Newark Star-Ledger, May 17, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
213. Barr Brothers & Co., Inc., The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated (June 12,
1975), reproduced in Brief for Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, State's Supplemental
Exhibit A, United States Trust Co. v. State, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1
(1977).
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withstanding the superior court decision the Port Authority continued
to be "one of the finest revenue credits in the country"2 14 and that "[a]t
presented] an outstanding and
these depressed levels, . . .[the2 1bonds
5

secure value for the investor."
To one familiar with the municipal bond industry the Barr Brothers
report was wholly understandable since the supreme court had just
acted so quickly on the appeal papers and Barr Brothers, as a Port
bond dealer, had in-house massive inventories of the bonds with heavy
paper losses-it had to act to bolster the market or see its position
continue to decline. But to an outsider unfamiliar with the day-to-day
operations of the market the report seemed to be directly contradictory
to the expert trial testimony with respect to the importance of the
Covenant to bondholder security.
The state reacted to the Barr Brothers report as one might expect. A
copy was attached as Exhibit A to the state's appeal brief2 21716 and the
brief itself was sprinkled liberally with references to it.
United States Trust's brief on appeal took issue with many of the
superior court's findings, but the key concept which the brief attempted to impress on the court was the trial court's apparent misreading of
the Worthen 21 8 case:
Thus, although in Kavanaugh the Court was careful to state that the destruction of
the quality of a security "as an acceptable investment for a rational investor"
constituted the "outermost limits" of the bounds of which a state may not transgress,
the Trial Court adopted these outer limits as its sole standard for determining the
constitutionality of the 1974 Legislation. According to the Trial Court, any transgression by the State which falls short of the "outermost limits," is constitutionally valid.
was an unconstitutional
The Trial Court has turned what to the Supreme 21Court
9
maximum into a required minimum demonstration.

For some reason the state did not make any reference to Worthen in
its main brief on appeal and in its reply brief referred to Worthen only
in a footnote,2 2 0 making no attempt to justify the superior court's
interpretation of the case. This tactic proved to be well-founded, since
after a desultory oral argument on October 7, 1975, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, on February 25, 1976, affirmed the judgment, per
curiam, "substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge
214.

Id.

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2, 50, 75.
218.

295 U.S. 56 (1935).

219. Brief for Appellant at 68, United States Trust Co. v. State, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d
514 (1976), revzd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (citations omitted).
220. Reply Brief for Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants at 20, United States Trust
Co. v. State, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Gelman. '' 221 Justice Pashman dissented in part, not with respect to
the validity of the repealer, which he heartily endorsed, but because
he thought the court should go even further, as requested by the Gaby
to formulate a plan for deplaintiff, and order the Port Authority
222
velopment of mass transit facilities.

V.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

United States Trust announced immediately that it would appeal the
affirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court.2 23 The jurisdictional statement was filed May 21, 1976.224 The state moved to dismiss the
appeal 225 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 28,
1976.226

At this point the Gaby case fell by the wayside.227 Both United
States Trust 228 and the Port Authority229 urged the Court to reach the
merits in Gaby and finally settle the issue of the Covenant's constitutional validity, but the Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, apparently because the Gaby issues had not been reached below.
Thus, the "final judgment" element of a section 1257 appeal 230 was
absent.
Main briefs were filed over the summer of 1976, with United States
Trust continuing to argue that the case was wrongly decided because
of an unwarranted expansion of Worthen:
If only those acts of the State which resulted in the destruction of a contract as an
acceptable investment were constitutionally impermissible, virtually no covenant or
combination of covenants in a bond resolution or statute would be safe from abrogation. There are innumerable covenants and provisions in bond resolutions and
statutes, the abrogation of which would not "destroy" the bond's security, but which
obviously would result in material impairment of it. Even measured by the "outermost
limits" of Kavanaugh repeal of the Covenant is constitutionally offensive. There the
221. 69 N.J. 253, 256, 353 A.2d 514, 515 (1976) (per curiam). The New Jersey court was a
full panel composed of Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clifford, and Pashman and three judges.
called up from the appellate division (Judges Conford, Carton, and Halpern) to bring the bench to
full strength for the case in light of one vacancy and two recusals.
222. Id. at 265-66, 353 A.2d at 520-21 (Pashman, J., dissenting in part).
223. Daily Bond Buyer, Feb. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 3
224. The appeal was as of right rather than through certiorari, as it was an appeal from a final
judgment of the highest court of a state upholding a state statute in the face of a federal
constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
225. Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Want of a Substantial Federal Question, United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
226. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 427 U.S. 903 (1976).
227. Gaby v. Port Auth., 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
228. Intervenor-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Gaby v. Port Auth., 427 U.S. 901
(1976).
229. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Gaby v Port Auth., 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
230.

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
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basic legislation remained; here the States' pledge has been unilaterally wiped from the
statute books. Further, the "rational investors" who testified below all said that to
them and their customers
Port Authority bonds without the Covenant were not an
231
acceptable investment.

As it did in the New Jersey Supreme Court, the state all but ignored
Worthen in its main brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, saying only:
In addition, the legislation must not reveal a "studied indifference" to the interests of
persons seeking to enforce contractual obligations. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56 (1935).
While appellant tries at length to read error into the trial court's discussion of
Worthen v. Kavanaugh, supra, A.B. 58-59, that court's treatment is perfectly consistent with this Court's analysis in FaitouteIron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316
U.S. 502, 515 (1942), where the Court inquired whether the legislature had been guilty
of "studied indifference" to private interests.3

Oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court is invariably a
fascinating scene, and it was no different on November 10, 1976, when
United States Trust was called. The first few moments of argument
were discouraging when Justices Stewart and Powell, whose judicial
philosophy was thought to be favorable to the United States Trust
side, left the bench. Justice Stewart returned almost immediately and
heard argument, but did not take part in the decision.
Devereux Milburn, for United States Trust, led off with a factual
history of the case 23 3 and then discussed the traditional predicate of an
emergency to ground an exercise of the police power:
Now, what justifies the use of the police power?
In such a case as we have here, if it can be justified-... Blaisdell and its progeny
established that it must be an emergency.
Now, Blaisdell had a real emergency. They had mobs in the Middle West. They
hadQUESTION: You mean something like the Minnesota Aortgage moratorium?
MR. MILBURN: This was it, yes. That was the statute in Blaisdell, and there
231. Brief for Appellant at 59, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
The Securities Industry Association, a trade association of investment bankers, underwriters,
brokers, dealers, and bond departments of banks, filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
Supreme Courts hearing the appeal. Securities Industry Association's Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amicus Curiae (Aug. 12, 1976) at 1-2, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977); Securities Industry Association's Brief of Amicus Curiae (June 4, 1976), United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Association also filed an amicus curiae brief on
the merits and moved for leave to file an amicus curiae reply brief, but the motion was denied.
Securities Industry Association's Brief of Amicus Curiae (Aug. 12, 1976), United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Securities Industry Association's Motion for Leave to File
Reply Brief Amicus Curiae at 2, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
232. Brief for Appellees at 85, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
233. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-12, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977).
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were riots and there were mobs, and something had to be done. The statute was
again and again and again
passed, and Mr. Justice Hughes' opinion in that
234 case refers
to emergency. He also refers to temporary.
QUESTION: So-well, was there an emergency about mass transit? 1 guess you
would say there isn't any more than there always had been?
MR. MILBURN: Well, I go back to 1921, if you'd like, and come all the way
through, there's always been an emergency-well, why use that word? Because I don't
think it's as chronic a situation.
An emergency to me is a house on fire.
If you came around a corner, you were the mayor of the town, and you see a house
on fire, what are you going to do? You will put it out. You're not going to go to your
desk and draft legislation to get a new fire department, which is going to come Into
existence ten years from now, and put the next fire out. The emergency is-an
emergency to us is something immediate.
And here we have a drop in the bucket, even when it works, all the Port Authority
23
could do is a drop in the bucket of the transit problem on the Eastern Seaboard. "

Counsel for the state opened his argument with eloquence: "Of all
the hundreds of cases alleging contract impairment that have come
before this Court in two centuries, none has involved public ends as
vital as those sought to be served by the State here,'236and few have
involved contract infringements so inconsequential.
The Court then went straight to the heart of the case-questioning
counsel for the state closely with respect to the nexus between repeal of
the Covenant and the emergency conditions it was allegedly intended
to alleviate:
QUESTION: Well, are there any methods of, just if you concentrate on that one
feature, limiting the amount of traffic coming across the bridge--are there any ways
that that could be done without tampering at all with the New York Port Authority?
With the bond holder structure.
Couldn't you close the bridge for a couple of hours a day?
[ANSWER]: You could, Your Honor. I do believe Mr. Milburn would be here
maintaining that that was a violation of covenants with bond holders. I do believe that
the police power does entitle the State to do that.
QUESTION: Is it possible . . .that closing the bridges down and doing some of
these other things that were suggested by Justice Stevens were politically unpalatable?
[ANSWER]: Well, there's no question about that, Your Honor, that neither LegislatureQUESTION: The voices of those people would be heard more widely than the
voices of the bond holders in the public arena, wouldn't they?
[ANSWER]: Well, there's no question about it237

The Court was also evidently concerned in its questions to counsel
at 14-15.
at 18-20.

234.
235.

Id.
Id.

236.

Id. at 24.

237.

Id.

at 27, 32.
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for the state with the possible alternatives to repeal which would have
been less intrusive on bondholders' rights but politically less popular.
QUESTION: -I

understand. But, nevertheless, if the State had wanted to-if the

States had wanted to commit their own credit rather than the Port Authority's, they
could have had the Port Authority go into mass transit as a separate single venture.
QUESTION: Yes, Well, that's what I'm asking you. Wasn't this some-this
certainly was a feasible and less intrusive way of going about it.

[ANSWER]: I'm afraid it wasn't feasible. And it-

QUESTION: Well, it wasn't feasible, but it was less intrusive, as far as the bond
holders go.
[ANSWER]: No2 38question the bond holders would have been happier had the States
done it that way.

Justice Marshall was clearly willing to look down the road to the
future losses which a mass transit operation would produce:
QUESTION: Well, mass transit is not going to bring in any profit.
[ANSWER]: That's absolutely correct, Your Honor, but lots of other projects are.
And this enterprise has always operated a number of deficit facilities, andQUESTION: And it's always stayed out of mass transit.
[ANSWER]: Well, that's not true, Your Honor. One of the fascinating things is
their peculiar belief thatQUESTION: Did anything in the record come up about San Francisco's mass
transit brainstorm?
[ANSWER]: There's nothing in the record, Your Honor.
QUESTION: Okay.
[ANSWER]: The recent-I saw a recent report that suggests it isn't doing so well,
but, of course, it wasn't running
very well, either. Everybody agrees that the PATH is
239
a very well-run railroad.

The Chief Justice was also concerned with future losses in his
questions to counsel for the state:
QUESTION: Well, I suppose the change in the risk here is not an immediate risk,
it's rather the risk that after the several years that are required to build the extension of
the railroad, they finally get it done and, like they did out in Oakland-and all, that
then you start losing larger sums of money than were anticipated, instead of it being a
$5 million deficit, it's $100 million deficit.
That's the kind of risk that I suppose is at stake here.
[ANSWER]: But it is a very hypothetical risk, Your Honor. The arrangement
between the PortQUESTION: Well, isn't there some factual basis for assuming that it can happen?
[ANSWER]: Oh, that it is possible? Yes, Your Honor.
QUESTION: Well, don't you have experience with this one railroad that you've
taken over, that its losses were much greater than anticipated?
[ANSWER]: Yes, but this deal does not contemplate the Port Authority paying
operating deficits. The arrangements that have been made will use the Port238.
239.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 44-45.
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QUESTION: Well, but the covenant would permit you to do-I mean, the repeal
would permit you to do so, wouldn't it?
[ANSWER]: The repealer would, but the State's legislation, and the implementing
administrative actions, have provided that the Port Authority is responsible only for
the debt service: a knowable defined figureQUESTION: But those various actions could be changed, if things get a little worse
and you need more money some place else, you change things one at a time, wouldn't
you?
[ANSWER]: Well, conceivably yes, Your Honor; although it is-the Port Authority
has, on many occasions, made its own promises to bond holders, without StateQUESTION: It has no obligation to keep them, apparently.
QUESTION: What do you suppose a referendum among the bond holders, on
whether the covenant should be repealed, would bring?
[ANSWER]: Well, I have no doubt, Your Honor, that they don't like it.
QUESTION: But you're just saying that they can still sell some bonds, but the
people buying bonds now are taking their risk.
[ANSWER]: What I'm suggesting to Your Honor4
QUESTION: The old bond holders didn't think they were taking any risk.2 0

On rebuttal counsel for United States Trust summed up the bondholders' case:
Why can't the States do something, except abrogate out [sic] contract? That's what I
would like to know. I don't know the answer to that kind of question.
Now, Mr. Justice Marshall, you mentioned a new deficit going into PATH. We've
got a beauty, we'll all admit that. We've got one running about $28 million. It was
supposed to run six, it's running 28.
Let's put another one in there, and let's say that the Commissioners are wrong
again, are wrong by a factor of five again, and let's say we've got another $30 million
deficit in there, and, in the meantime, PATH has gone up. We're talking about $70
million deficit. Let's have a little depression, let's have our airports slack off a little bit,
and they are going to default on the bonds.
That's why we don't want a tremendous new deficit into the Port Authority,
and you
241
can't stop it because it comes in as a baby and it grows into a giant.

All the hard questions had been asked, and the feeling was that the
Court expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with the repeal, almost a
sense of outrage, that would never be apparent from the pages of the
transcript. Justice Marshall was thought to be one of the Justices most
upset by the repeal; some of his questions to counsel for the state
bordered in tone on sarcastic. The Chief Justice seemed equally
unhappy with the failure of the state to examine any course but
outright repeal, and Justice White repeatedly asked whether less
intrusive alternatives could not have accomplished the states' objectives, a concern shared by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and, to a
240.
241.

Id. at 47-48, 50, 51.
Id. at 55-56.
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lesser extent, by Justice Blackmun. The two imponderables were
Justices Brennan and Stewart, who took little part in the argument,
but were thought to be on opposite sides of the issue because of their
positions in other cases.
United States Trust is thus an excellent example of the fact that you
cannot tell very much from oral argument.

VI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On April 27, 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court, 4-3, reversed the New
Jersey Supreme Court and struck down the repeal of the 1962 Cove242
nant as violative of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion,7 43 concurred in by
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and by the Chief Justice, who also filed
a concurring statement.24 4 Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and White. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision,
and Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Justice Blackmun first reviewed the establishment of the Port Authority "as a financially independent entity, with funds primarily
derived from private investors," 24 5 and referred to the trial court's
finding that the agency was not originally intended to assume passenger transit responsibilities. 246 He then outlined the fiscal policy of
the Port Authority, noting the trial court finding that after the Consolidated Bond Resolution of 1952 the agency's self-supporting facility
concept "ceased to have the significance previously attached to it."124 7
Reviewing the renewed interest in mass transit, Justice Blackmun
characterized as a "retaliation" to mass transit proposals the institution
of the section 7 certification by the agency and also referred to the 1959
commuter car program. 248 Then the Court summarized the H&M
takeover, quoting the trial court conclusion that "it was necessary to
place a limitation on mass transit deficit operations to be undertaken
by the Authority in the future so as to promote continued investor
242. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
243. Id. This had been expected by veteran Court-watchers who know that Justice Blackmun
is one of the slower authors on the Court. By April, five months after argument, he was running
several opinions behind his pace of a year earlier and it was concluded that United States Trust
was one of the cases occupying his time.
244. Id. at 32.
245. Id. at 4.
246. Id. at 5 n.6.
247. Id. at 7 n.8 (quoting 134 N.J. Super. at 143, 338 A.2d at 843).
248. Id. at 8.
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The Court then described the Cove-

The terms of the covenant were self-evident. Within its conditions the covenant
permitted, and perhaps even contemplated, additional Port Authority involvement in
the
deficit rail mass transit as its financial position strengthened, since the limitation of
0
covenant was linked to, and would expand with, the general reserve fund.5

The Court then discussed the increasing PATH deficits in the face of
static tolls, despite recommended increases, 25 1 and the 1973 prospective repeal of the Covenant, 25 2 which did not result in the expected
transit improvements:
It soon developed that the proposed PATH expansion would not take place as
contemplated in the Governors' 1972 plan. New Jersey was unwilling to increase its
financial commitment in response to a sharp increase in the projected cost of constructing the Plainfield extension. As a result the anticipated federal grant was not
approved. 25

Finally, the Court briefly recounted the retroactive repeal of the
increases to augment the agency's
Covenant and the subsequent toll
25 4

mass transit financing abilities.
At the threshold of his legal discussion Justice Blackmun acknowledged the preeminence of the contract clause as a significant limit on
state power during our nation's first century and the fourteenth
amendment's preeminence during the second. 255 The Court then reviewed Blaisdell and El Paso as representing the Court's view of the
"present role of the Contract Clause, '

256

concluding:

Both of these cases eschewed a rigid application of the Contract Clause to invalidate

state legislation. Yet neither indicated that the Contract Clause was without meaning
in modern constitutional jurisprudence, or that its limitation on state power was
illusory. Whether or not the protection of contract rights comports with current views
of wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains a part of our written Constitution.
249. Id. at 9 (quoting from 134 N.J. Super. at 178, 338 A.2d at 863-64).
250. Id. at 11. The Court noted without comment the unsuccessful constitutional attack on the
legislation containing the Covenant: Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 12 N.Y.2d
379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963); see Kheel v. Port
Auth., 331 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
983 (1972). The Court then went on to say that "[w]ith the legislation embracing the covenant
thus effective" the Port Authority took over the H&M. 431 U.S. at 11. This is a strong indication
that the Gaby issue, if ever reached by the Court, would be disposed of summarily.
251. 431 U.S. at 11-12.
252.- Id. at 13.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id. at 13-14.
255. Id. at 14-15.
256. Id. at 14-16.
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We therefore must attempt to apply that constitutional provision to the 2instant case
with due respect for its purpose and the prior decisions of this Court. 57

This expressed the first tenet of United States Trust: there is no per
se rule of contract clause application-no automatic invalidation of an
impairment of any specific type of contract, no matter how carefully
conceived or callously abrogated. The post-Civil War depression
cases, 258 which were thought not to survive Blaisdell, clearly do not
survive United States Trust insofar as they suggest literal constitutional protection of bond covenants.
Justice Blackmun then turned to the basic claim that a contract had
been impaired, saying on the one hand that the contract clause applies
to state as well as private contracts 259 and on the other that the clause
did not affect the states' general power to repeal or amend statutes or
to give legislation retroactive effect. 260 Finding that the 1962 Covenant
"has been properly characterized as a contractual obligation of the two
States '261 the Court considered the arguments made with respect to
the value of the Covenant to bondholders, concluding.
The fact is that no one can be sure precisely how much financial loss the bondholders
suffered. Factors unrelated to repeal may have influenced price. In addition, the
market may not have reacted fully, even as yet, to the covenant's repeal, because of
the pending litigation and the possibility that the repeal would be nullified by the
courts.

In any event, the question of valuation need not be resolved in the instant case
because the State has made no effort to compensate the bondholders for any loss
sustained by the repeal. As a security provision, the covenant was not superfluous; it
limited the Port Authority's deficits and thus protected the general reserve fund from
depletion. Nor was the covenant merely modified or replaced by an arguably comparable security provision. Its outright repeal totally eliminated an important
security
262
provision and thus impaired the obligation of the States' contract.

Thus the Court found that because a material security device was
cancelled there was no need to reach the further issue of claimed
damage to the secondary market.
At this point the second principal teaching of United States Trust is
expressed in a footnote. 263 Contract rights, notwithstanding the literal
257.

Id.

at 16.

258. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
259. 431 U.S. at 17 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810), and
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)).
260. Id. at 17.
261.

Id.

at 18.

262. Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted). This was precisely the same ground of impairment found
by the trial court. See text accompanying note 198 supra.
263. 431 U.S. at 19 n.16 (citing Contributors to the Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245
U.S. 20 (1917), and City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, S33-34 (196S) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
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phrasing of the contract clause, are a form of property which, as with
other property, can "be taken for a public purpose provided that just
'264
compensation is paid.

In a municipal bond case the compensation issue raises enormously
complex problems. If a security device is "taken for a public use" how
is compensation to be determined? By reference to the value of the
investment without it? By reference to whether the obligation to pay
principal and interest has been materially affected? By reference to
market reaction? As part of the "compensation" element one presumably would have to consider comparable alternative security devices or
additional security pledged in lieu of the cancelled promise. These
issues will have to await another day.
Now that the Court had a contract and an impairment it considered
"whether that impairment violated the Contract Clause,' 26s and
promptly discarded, as noted above, any concept of a per se rule:
Thus, a finding that there has been a technical impairment is merely a preliminary step
in resolving the more difficult question whether that impairment is permitted under the
Constitution. In the instant case, as in Blaisdell, we must attempt to reconcile the
strictures of the Contract Clause with the "essential attributes of sovereign power,"
necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare of their citizens.
The trial court concluded that repeal of the 1962 covenant was a valid exercise of New
Jersey's police power because repeal served important public interests in mass transportation, energy conservation, and environmental protection. Yet the Contract
Clause limits otherwise legitimate exercises of state legislative authority, and the
existence of an important public interest is not always sufficient to overcome that
limitation. "Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with
the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power." Moreover, the scope of
the State's reserved power depends on the nature of the contractual relationship with
2 66
which the challenged law conflicts.

The Court freely acknowledged the state's broad power to regulate
without concern for destruction of private contracts, since private
arrangements could not have the effect of securing immunity from
state regulation. 267 But even this broad power is not unrestrictedlaws regulating existing private contracts "must serve a legitimate
268
public purpose":
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

19 n.16.
21.
21-22 (citations omitted).
22 ("One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot

remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.") (citing Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)).
268. Id. at 22 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-45 (1934)).
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A State could not "adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of
contracts or the denial of means to enforce them." Legislation adjusting the rights and
responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption. As is customary in
reviewing economic and social regulation, however, courts properly defer to legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure. 269

Here was the third principle of United States Trust: While the
states' power to regulate where private contracts are infringed or
destroyed is broad, it is not without limits, and will be tested by the

reasonableness of the legislation in the light of all the circumstances.
The factors to be assessed, which "cannot be regarded as essential in
every case, ' 270 include (1) the existence of an emergency, and (2) the
27 1
duration of any relief.
Putting aside the private contract issue, Justice Blackmun turned to
a state's impairment of its own contract, where "the reserved power
doctrine has a different basis." 272 He first discussed the ability of a

state to make a contract limiting its power to act in the future; for if
the state lacked power ab initio to create an irrevocable undertaking,
then the issue of the reasonableness of its subsequent impairment

would never be reached.2 73 "In short, the Contract Clause does not

require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential
274
attribute of its sovereignty.1
Historically the police power and the power of eminent domain were
considered inalienable, while 275
the state could commit itself with respect
to future taxes or spending:
Such formalistic distinctions perhaps cannot be dispositive, but they contain an
important element of truth. Whatever the propriety of a State's binding itself to a
future course of conduct in other contexts, the power to enter into effective financial
contracts cannot be questioned. Any financial obligation could be regarded in theory as
a relinquishment of the State's spending power, since money spent to repay debts is not
available for other purposes. Similarly, the taxing power may have to be exercised if
269. Id. at 22-23 (citations and footnote omitted).
270. Id. at 22 n.19.
271. Id. The Court invited a comparison of W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426,
432-34 (1934), and Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 195 (1936), with Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. &Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S.
32, 39-40 (1940), and East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
272. 431 U.S. at 23.
273. Id. at 23.
274. Id. at 23.
275. Id. at 24. The tax conclusion is very doubtful, but no Supreme Court case has squarely
held that the tax power is within the "inalienable" category. Id. at 24 n.21.
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debts are to be repaid. Notwithstanding these effects,
the Court has regularly held that
27 6
the States are bound by their debt contracts.

Turning back to the case in issue, the Court crossed the threshold,
holding: "The instant case involves a financial obligation and thus as a
threshold matter may not be said automatically to
fall within the
'2 77
reserved powers that cannot be contracted away.
But the Court continued, "Not every security provision . . . is
necessarily financial, ' '2 7 8 positing a revenue bond secured by a promise
to operate the facility producing the revenues, with residual power in
the state to close the facility "for health or safety reasons. ' 279 But with
respect to the 1962 Covenant:
The security provision at issue here, however, is different: the States promised that
revenues and reserves securing the bonds would not be depleted by the Port Authority's operation of deficit-producing passenger railroads beyond the level of "permitted
deficits." Such a promise is purely
financial and thus not necessarily a compromise of
280
the State's reserved powers.

Thus the Court reached the plateau of finding that the 1962 Covenant was valid when adopted. But here the cofntract clause inquiry
begins rather than ends:
Of course, to say that the financial restrictions of the 1962 covenant were valid when
adopted does not finally resolve this case. The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar
to subsequent modification of a State's own financial obligations. As with laws
impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if
it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In applying this
standard, however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake. A
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do
not have to be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it
276.

Id. at 24 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted with approval the specific holdings in

the post-Civil War depression cases that a state could not enable a subdivision to borrow and

then limit its taxing power, thus frustrating repayment. Louisiana v. City of New Orleans, 215
U.S. 170 (1909); Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881); Von Hoffman v. City of

Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867). As discussed above in the text accompanying note 258,
however, it did not adopt the per se rule suggested by those cases.
277. 431 U.S. at 24-25 (footnote omitted).
278. Id. at 25.

279. Id. The example was a confusing and unnecessary misstep by the Court. Better to
conclude that the promise to continue operating the facility is a "financial" obligation, as It Is
viewed by municipal bond counsel and investors, and then to consider whether the state could
superimpose the police power in a health or safety emergency. A promise of this type should
clearly satisfy the Court's initial inquiry and fall within the irrevocable category; whether that
promise may be modified if reasonable should be a subsequent inquiry.
280. Id. at 25.
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wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.2s8

The Court then began to structure its legal test, and agreed with
counsel for United States Trust that Worthen did not control the case:
The trial court's "total destruction" test is based on what we think is a misreading of
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). In the first place, the
impairment held unconstitutional in Kavanaugh was one that affected the value of a
security provision, and certainly not every bond would have been worthless. More
importantly, Mr. Justice Cardozo needed only to state an "outermost limits" test in the
Court's opinion, id., at 60, because the impairment was so egregious. He expressly
recognized that the actual line between permissible and impermissible impairments
could well be drawn more narrowly. Thus the trial court was not correct when it drew
the negative inference that any impairment less oppressive than the one in Kavanaugh
was necessarily constitutional. The extent of impairment is certainly a relevant factor
in determining its reasonableness. But we cannot sustain the repeal of the 1962
covenant simply because the bondholders' rights were not totally destroyed. 28-

The Court then considered Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
Asbury Park,283 the one Supreme Court case in modern times that had
upheld alteration of a municipal bond contract. Faitoute, however,
was not controlling. There the bond alternatives enabled the city to
cure a default, to discharge an obligation, and the market value of the
bonds went up. 284 United States Trust involved "a much more serious
impairment than occurred in Faitoute,"'285 and no one contended that
the states acted to help bondholders or that the secondary market was
enhanced by repeal.
Finally, the Court turned to the claimed defense of repeal: the
argument that harm to bondholders was outweighed by the goals of
mass transit, energy conservation, and environmental improvement
sought to be benefited by repeal. 28 6 Justice Blackmun immediately
declined to engage in the balancing so feared by Justice Black in El
2s
Paso: - 7
281. Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote the Court referred to the stricter standard
applied when the impairment is occasioned by a need for money. Id. at 26 n.25; see Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934).

282. 431 U.S. at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). The Court even agreed with the main brief on
appeal that since here an express promise had been cancelled rather than an implied promise as in
Worthen, "the instant case may be regarded as a more serious abrogation of the bondholders'
expectations than occurred in [Wortheni." Id. at 26 n.26.
283.

316 U.S. 502 (1942).

284. 431 U.S. at 27-28.
285. Id. at 28.
286. Id. at 28-29.
287. Id. at 29.
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Thus a State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it
would prefer to spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private
welfare of its creditors. We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962 covenant if that
and necessary to serve the admittedly important
impairment was both reasonable
288
purposes claimed by the State.

This is the fourth principle of the case and the key to United States

Trust: however reasonable the proposed modification of a state's own
financial obligation, it will not be upheld unless it can be shown that
such action was not only reasonable but necessary to serve important
state purposes.
Where necessity is the test, the availability of other less intrusive
alternatives becomes a critical area of inquiry. Thus Justice Blackmun
considered the state's specific justification for repeal-the plan to raise
bridge and tunnel tolls to discourage auto use and use the revenues to
subsidize commuter rail service. Here repeal was neither necessary to
achieve the plan nor reasonable in the circumstances. The necessity
test was not satisfied because a less intrusive adjustment of the
Covenant, short of total cancellation, would have been enough.
Further, there were obvious alternatives to reach the goals of inhibiting auto use and improving railroads, 28 9 and the state is not "completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts
on a par with other policy alternatives [nor] to impose a drastic
and more moderate course would serve
impairment when an evident
'2 90
its purposes equally well."
Nor to the Court was .repeal reasonable. Unlike El Paso, where the
effect of a 19th century statute was unforeseen and unintended, both
the need for mass transit and its deficit nature were well known for
years before the Covenant was enacted; in fact, these problems were
the reason for its enactment. 291 Changes between 1962 and the
Covenant's repeal were "of degree and not of kind" 2 92 and thus repeal
was not reasonable in light of the change in circumstances, which was
288. Id.
289. Id. at 30.
290. Id. at 30-31. A somewhat disconcerting note in the Court's opinion suggests that one
alternative might be to limit mass transit diversions to the "new" bridge and tunnel tolls, or to
increase the "permitted deficit" formula, or to loosen the bondholder consent procedures. But this
note was clearly only for the purpose of illustrating that the states had gone too far in their total
cancellation of the Covenant, and the note concluded: "Of course, we express no opinion as to
whether any of these lesser impairments would be constitutional." Id. at 30 n.28; see concurring
statement of Burger, C.J., id. at 32-33.
291. Id. at 31-32.
292. Id. at 32.

19771

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY

the key element in El Paso: "We therefore hold that the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the retroactive
repeal of the 1962 covenant. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
'293
New Jersey is reversed.
In his brief concurring statement the Chief Justice read the Court's
opinion as requiring the state to demonstrate that impairment was
essential to achieve an important state purpose and furthermore that
the state "did not know and could not have known the impact of the
contract on that state interest at the time that the contract was
made.1

294

Justice Brennan, dissenting, first reviewed the undisputed effectiveness of the Covenant in limiting Port Authority mass transit involvement, and then reviewed the energy and environmental concerns that
were put forth to justify repeal. 295 The dissent expressed puzzlement at
the majority's formulation of the necessity test, concluding that the
alternatives proposed were "simply . . . not responsive" to the Port

District's environmental and traffic problems. 2 96 Nor was Justice
Brennan satisfied with Justice Blackmun's view of reasonableness:
"Nowhere are we told why a state policy, no matter how responsive to
the general welfare of its citizens, can be reasonable only if it confronts
issues that previously were absolutely unforeseen.1 297 The dissent

reviewed at some length the allegedly negligible injury to bondholders
which resulted from repeal, 298 a point effectively refuted by the
majority, which pointed out that if the Covenant in fact meant so little
then surely the states could simply have condemned it and paid the
negligible compensation required. 299 The fact that the states did not
choose this route is almost conclusive evidence in itself of the Covenant's material importance to investors.
The dissent then reviewed the history of the contract clause, concluding in essence that the clause today should be viewed as a vestigial
appendage to the Constitution and that courts should defer all but
conclusively to a legislative determination of whether the clause is
offended by retroactive civil legislation. 30 0 In short the dissent was
willing to leave bond purchasers to fend for themselves in the mar293.

Id.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Burger, C.J., concurring).
at 33-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 41-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 29 n.27.
at 44-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ketplace without a judicial remedy. One must wonder how the bondholders could have had their voices heard in the present case, where
the states acted without notice, without hearings, without debates, and
of repeal was
with one governor freely admitting that the sole purpose
30 1
to prompt a court test of the Covenant's validity.

VII.

CONCLUSION
United States Trust was hailed by the municipal bond community as
establishing almost conclusive constitutional protection for municipal
bond covenants. 30 2 It is not quite that. Opponents, on the other hand,
foretold that the decision would have a profound adverse effect on rail
mass transit in the Port District. 30 3 This is hardly the case. What the
Court said was that public bond contracts will be treated with due
respect and will withstand attempts at abrogation prompted principally by contemporary political expediency.
In reaching this conclusion the Court established the guidelines for
the modern application of the contract clause in a society infinitely
more complex than the one which prompted the formulation of the
clause. In summary, notwithstanding the literal language of the clause,
there is no per se rule; there are no contracts which will forever be
impervious to subsequent state legislation. Second, all contracts are, as
other property, subject to the states' powers of eminent domain, a
principle which raises enormously complex issues when applied to
municipal bond covenants. Third, where state regulation impinges on
private contracts the legislature will be given broad leeway, but the
legislation nevertheless must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances, and relevant factors to be considered are the existence of
an emergency and the scope of the relief. Finally, there are areas
where the states are competent as sovereigns to enter into binding
obligations, and financial covenants with state creditors are a classic
example. But even here the promise may not be entirely durable; any
change, however, will be tested by a joint standard of reasonableness
plus necessity.
United States Trust presents at the same time a primer for
enactment of an irrevocable financial obligation and a recipe for its
subsequent modification. Neither process should be undertaken casu301. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
302. E.g., N.Y. Times, May 2, 1977, at 51, col. 3; Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1977, at 12, col. 1-2;
Am. Banker, Apr. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
303. E.g., Newark Star-Ledger, May 1, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
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ally. The case was won (or lost) by the narrowest of margins, and it may
well have been that a properly orchestrated modification of the 1962
Covenant would have withstood constitutional attack. But the process of adjusting prior bond covenants is an agonizing one at best. In
United States Trust investors suffered paper and actual losses which
may have totalled millions of dollars while the market fluctuated in the
months following repeal. The State of New Jersey suffered in the
minds of potential investors and was forced to pay increased interest
costs when its credit rating was dropped by the principal rating
agency, in part because of the repeal of the Covenant.3 04 The State of
New York suffered as did its agencies when many informed institutional investors simply crossed New York and New Jersey off their
lists because of the repeal. 30 5 Experts viewed the repeal of the Covenant as a principal contributing factor to the financial collapse of the
New York Urban Development Corporation 30 6 and the end of the moral
obligation bond as an effective tool of municipal finance. 30 7 The
Port Authority, in every sense a bystander in the conflict between the
states and the agency's investors, saw its financing program stopped
dead in the water for almost three years while the judicial process went
on. In a sense the courts of New Jersey suffered, since bond lawyers
are confident that repeal of the Covenant would never have been
sustained by the New York Court of Appeals, 30 8 and prior to United
States Trust the New Jersey judiciary had been viewed as the most
steadfast advocates in the nation of the rights of municipal inves30 9
tors.

In short, the damage done by the repeal of the 1962 Covenant far
exceeded any possible benefit to the states from a few extra dollars for
mass transit. If there is a practical lesson to be learned from United
States Trust it is that political expediency can never justify in fact the
cavalier repudiation of a sovereign's promises to its investors.
304. See Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Municipal Credit Report, State of New Jersey (June
23, 1975).
305. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
306. See N.Y. State Moreland Act Comm'n on the Urban Dev. Corp. & Other State
Financing Agencies, Restoring Credit and Confidence 161 (Mar. 31, 1976).
307. See note 136 supra; Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Policy Statement (June 23, 1975).
308. See, e.g., Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358
N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Patterson v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 714, 363 N.E.2d 1146. 395
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1977).
309. See, e.g., New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of East Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972); New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Sills, 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d
498 (Ch. Div.), supplemented, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971).
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The legal lesson of United States Trust is just as clear. The
financially independent public authority represents the modern format
for accomplishing great public purpose projects while not increasing
the general tax burden. Where its covenants and those of states and
their subdivisions are constructed to ensure the financial well-being of
the issuer, then those covenants will be sustained short of a demonstration that the covenant must yield because that course is not only
reasonable but necessary to effectuate a legitimate state interest. This
is, as it should be, a most difficult test. Hopefully, it is one that will
rarely be applied.

